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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------- X 
ANNE CAMERON CAIN, individually and as 
representative on behalf of the Estate of ALEXANDER 
PINCZOWSKI;  
BEATRIZ GONZALEZ, individually and as 
representative on behalf of the Estate of NOHEMI 
GONZALEZ; JOSE HERNANDEZ; REY GONZALEZ; 
AND PAUL GONZALEZ, 
 Plaintiffs, 
 -against- 
TWITTER, INC., 
  Defendant. 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------- X 
 
 
 
 
 
Docket No:  
17-CV-_____________ 
 
 
COMPLAINT 
 
 
Jury trial demanded 
 
 
 
 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys, allege the following against Defendant Twitter, 
Inc. (“Twitter” or “Defendant”): 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1. This is an action for damages against Twitter pursuant to the Antiterrorism Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 2333 (“ATA”), as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act 
(“JASTA”), Pub. L. No. 114-222 (2016), and related claims, for having knowingly provided 
material support and resources to ISIS, a notorious terrorist organization that has engaged in and 
continues to commit terror attacks, including the March 22, 2016 terrorist attacks in Brussels, 
Belgium that murdered 32 people, including Mr. Alexander Pinczowski and his sister Ms. Sascha 
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Pinczowski, and the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France that murdered 130 
people, including Ms. Nohemi Gonzalez. 
2. As an outgrowth of al-Qaeda, ISIS has become one of the largest and most 
widely-recognized and feared terrorist organizations in the world. The United States Government 
designated ISIS as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (“FTO”) under Section 219 of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (“INI”), as amended, on December 17, 2004. 
3. ISIS early embraced Twitter as a powerful weapon for terrorism. Twitter’s social 
media platform and services provide tremendous utility and value to ISIS as a tool to connect its 
members and to facilitate the terrorist group’s ability to communicate, recruit members, plan and 
carry out attacks, and strike fear in its enemies. 
4. Twitter’s services have played a uniquely essential role in the development of 
ISIS’s image, its success in recruiting members from around the world, and its ability to carry 
out attacks and intimidate its enemies. 
5. For example, ISIS uses Twitter to massively inflate its image and the impact of its 
terrorist attacks and atrocities by using “bots,” specialized Twitter “apps,” and “hashtag 
hijacking” to rapidly send tens of thousands of tweets to make it look like it has more numbers 
and support than it really does. 
6. ISIS also uses Twitter to distribute high-production-quality videos, images, and 
online magazines that make it appear more sophisticated, established, and invincible. By using 
Twitter “storms” as a distribution system for these materials, ISIS ensures that the materials are 
then transferred to a large number of access points on the internet, so that the materials remain 
widely available online even if deleted by other social media platforms. 
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7. ISIS has used Twitter to cultivate and maintain an image of brutality, to instill 
greater fear and intimidation, and to appear unstoppable, by disseminating videos and images of 
numerous beheadings and other brutal killings, including setting captives on fire, blowing them 
up with explosives, slowly lowering them in a cage underwater to drown, and more. 
8. In this case, ISIS used Twitter to specifically threaten France and Belgium that 
they would be attacked for participating in a coalition of nations against ISIS, to celebrate 
smaller attacks leading up to these two major attacks, and to transform the operational leader of 
the Paris attack into a “celebrity” among jihadi terrorists in the year leading up to the Paris attack 
via Twitter-distributed magazine articles and videos featuring his ISIS exploits in Syria, France 
and Belgium. 
9. ISIS also used Twitter to announce the Paris and Brussels attacks, to intensify the 
intimidation of the attacks through Twitter “storms” during and in the immediate aftermath of the 
attacks, and to claim credit for the attacks. 
10. In addition, after the Paris attack, ISIS used Twitter to distribute a video made in 
anticipation of the attack showing each of the ISIS terrorists who carried out the attacks telling of 
their intentions and then executing a captive for the camera either by shooting or beheading. 
11. ISIS also used Twitter after both the Paris and Brussels attacks to distribute online 
magazines and videos showing carnage from the attacks, and featuring profiles and statements of 
the attackers glorifying their roles in the attacks and threatening more attacks. 
12. The ISIS planners and attackers also used Twitter to communicate and follow 
other ISIS Twitter accounts. 
13. For example, plaintiffs have identified Twitter accounts of the operational leader 
of the Paris attack and of the bomb-maker for both the Paris and Brussels attacks, who also 
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carried out a suicide bombing in the Brussels attacks. Both of these ISIS terrorists used Twitter 
to follow other ISIS Twitter accounts, including accounts designed to indoctrinate ISIS followers 
in the radical terrorist Islamist ideology of ISIS. 
14. For years, ISIS, its leaders, spokesmen, and members openly maintained and used 
official Twitter accounts with little or no interference. Despite extensive media coverage, 
complaints, legal warnings, petitions, congressional hearings, and other attention for providing 
its online social media platform and communications services to ISIS, Twitter has continued to 
provide these resources and services to ISIS and its affiliates, refusing to actively identify ISIS 
Twitter accounts, and only reviewing accounts reported by other Twitter users. 
15. Moreover, Twitter has taken a number of measures that actually serve to “protect” 
ISIS’s use of Twitter; for example, Twitter has had a policy of notifying Twitter users if it 
suspects government surveillance of their Twitter accounts or if the government subpoenas 
information about Twitter accounts; Twitter is suing the Department of Justice, seeking to defy 
orders to keep details of investigative subpoenas secret despite government warnings that 
disclosure may harm national security; Twitter has banned U.S. intelligence agencies from 
buying Twitter analytical services from Twitter-controlled “Dataminr” that would assist in 
identifying terrorist threats and activities; and Twitter used its “anti-harassment” policy to shut 
down the Twitter accounts of users from the group “Anonymous” who were identifying and 
reporting ISIS Twitter accounts to Twitter. 
16. Twitter has knowingly provided material support and resources to ISIS in the 
form of Twitter’s online social network platform and communication services. ISIS has used and 
relied on Twitter’s online social network platform and communications services as among its 
most important tools to facilitate and carry out its terrorist activity, including the terrorist attacks 
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in which ISIS murdered Nohemi Gonzalez and siblings Alexander and Sascha Pinczowski. By 
providing its online social network platform and communications services to ISIS, Twitter: 
violated the federal prohibitions on providing material support or resources for acts of 
international terrorism (18 U.S.C. § 2339A) and providing material support or resources to 
designated foreign terrorist organizations (18 U.S.C. § 2339B); aided and abetted and conspired 
with a designated FTO in the commission of acts of international terrorism as defined by 18 
U.S.C. § 2331; and committed acts of international terrorism as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331. 
Accordingly, Twitter is liable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333 and other claims to the plaintiffs, 
who were injured by reason of acts of international terrorism. 
THE PARTIES 
A. The Plaintiffs 
17. Plaintiff Anne Cameron Cain is a citizen of the United States and is domiciled in 
the United States. She brings claims individually and as the representative of the estate of her 
husband, Alexander Pinczowski, who was a resident of the United States at the time of his death. 
18. Plaintiff Beatriz Gonzalez is a citizen of the United States and is domiciled in the 
United States. She brings claims individually and as the representative of the estate of her 
daughter, Nohemi Gonzalez, who was also a citizen of the United States at the time of her death. 
19. Plaintiff José Hernandez is the step-father of Nohemi Gonzalez, and is a citizen of 
the United States who is domiciled in the United States. 
20. Plaintiffs Rey Gonzalez and Paul Gonzalez are the brothers of Nohemi Gonzalez. 
Plaintiff Ray Gonzalez is a United States legal resident, and Plaintiff Paul Gonzalez is a United 
States citizen. 
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B. The Defendant 
21. Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter” or “Defendant”) is a corporation organized under the laws 
of Delaware, with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. 
JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
22. Twitter is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court. Twitter is at home in the United 
States because it is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in California. 
Twitter may be found in this District and has an agent in this District. It maintains a systematic 
presence in this District, including more than 140,000 square feet of office space and 
approximately 100 employees and is registered to do business in the State of New York. 
23. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1331 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2333 and 2334, as this is a civil action brought by nationals of the United 
States who have been killed or injured by reason of acts of international terrorism, and/or their 
estates, survivors, and heirs. 
24. Venue is proper in this district pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2334(a). 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS 
I. ISIS: A DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
A. Al-Zarqawi and the Internet as a new weapon in the global terrorist’s arsenal 
25. ISIS has its origins in the terrorist group “Jam’at al Tawhid wa’al-Jihad,” (“The 
Monotheism and Jihad Group”), founded in 1999 by the radical Islamic terrorist leader Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi (“al-Zarqawi”). The group was also popularly known as simply “Tawhid” or 
the “al-Zarqawi Network.” The following is a picture of al-Zarqawi and the Tawhid flag: 
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26. Al-Zarqawi promoted a vision of Sunni Islamic eschatology in which violent 
attacks on non-believers, heretics, and apostates are not only justified, but religiously mandated. 
He taught that such attacks would lead to the establishment of an Islamic state and accelerate a 
global apocalyptic battle in which Islam will ultimately triumph and govern the world. 
27. ISIS maintains Al-Zarqawi’s vision of Islam. 
28. ISIS regards Islam as a religion of conquest, and it understands the concept of 
jihad (“holy war”) literally, as an obligation to use violence and engage in battle to attain the 
goals of Islam. 
29. While al-Zarqawi was not the first to use the Internet to wage jihad, he is known 
for taking Internet communication and propaganda in the service of terrorism to a new level. 
30. Borrowing from the tactics of Pakistani Islamist terrorists who circulated a 
videotape of their beheading of Jewish-American journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002, al-Zarqawi 
joined shocking images of graphic violence and cruelty with the developing technologies of the 
Internet to fashion a new weapon in the psychological war of terrorism. 
31. On May 11, 2004, al-Zarqawi’s group posted a link on the Muntada al-Ansar al-
Islami (“Forum of the Islamic Supporters”) (“al-Ansar”) website forum to a five-and-a-half-
minute video titled, “Sheikh Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi Slaughters an American Infidel” (the “Berg 
Video”). 
32. The Berg Video showed five hooded terrorists dressed in black standing behind 
abducted Jewish-American businessman Nicholas Berg, who was sitting and dressed in an 
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orange jumpsuit (reminiscent of the orange prison uniforms worn by captured terrorists held by 
the U.S. at Guantanamo Bay). The following is a screen-shot from the Berg Video: 
 
33. The Berg Video next showed one of the hooded men (presumed to be al-Zarqawi) 
read a statement condemning reported abuse of security prisoners at the Iraqi Abu Ghraib prison, 
after which he pulled a knife from his shirt, stepped forward, and sawed off Berg’s head. 
34. Although the al-Ansar website forum crashed due to the volume of downloads, 
the video of the al-Zarqawi’s beheading of Berg was copied to other sites and downloaded many 
thousands of times. It still circulates on the Internet today. 
35. In 2006 The Atlantic magazine described the effect of the Berg Video as follows: 
“With the slash of a knife, al-Zarqawi had pulled off the most successful online terrorist PR 
campaign ever . . . Al-Zarqawi’s success was possible because he had anticipated the importance 
of the Internet—an increasingly important weapon in the global terrorist arsenal.”1 
36. But al-Zarqawi had only begun with the beheading of Nicholas Berg. After the 
Berg Video, al-Zarqawi’s terrorist group continued to post even more videos on the Internet 
showing al-Zarqawi and his followers beheading foreign captives, including the following: 
                                                          
1 Nadya Labi, “Jihad 2.0,” The Atlantic (July/August 2006), http://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2006/07/jihad-20/304980/. 
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a. Kim Sun-il, a South Korean interpreter and Christian missionary, 
beheaded in June 2004; 
b. Georgi Lazov, a Bulgarian truck driver, beheaded in July 2004; 
c. Mohammed Mutawalli, an Egyptian citizen, beheaded in August 2004; 
d. Twelve Nepali citizens murdered on film, one was beheaded and the 
others were shot, in August 2004; 
e. Eugene Armstrong, a U.S. construction contractor, beheaded in September 
2004; 
f. Jack Hensley, a U.S. construction contractor, beheaded in September 
2004; 
g. Kenneth Bigly, a British civil engineer, beheaded in October 2004; and 
h. Shosei Koda, a Japanese tourist, beheaded in October 2004. 
37. Al-Zarqawi also produced and disseminated other forms of jihadi media on the 
Internet. For example, in June 2004, al-Zarqawi released the first part of a full hour-long 
propaganda video titled, “The Winds of Victory.” 
38. The “Winds of Victory” video opened with the American nighttime bombing of 
Baghdad, as mocking captions flashed the words “Democracy” and “Freedom” across the screen 
in Arabic; the nighttime bombing, in which only flashes of explosions could be seen, was 
contrasted with graphic scenes in full daylight of mutilated Iraqi children and abuse from Abu 
Ghraib prison. 
39. The “Winds of Victory” also highlighted foreign fighters who joined al-Zarqawi 
from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and other places, reading their wills in preparation for suicide 
missions, followed by footage of their murderous bombings, often from multiple angles. 
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40. Because al-Zarqawi’s group did not have the Internet capability of mass-
distributing a single 90-megabyte video file, the hour-long video had to be broken into chapters 
and released piecemeal over the course of several weeks. 
41. Nevertheless, al-Zarqawi’s relatively low-tech yet innovative use of the Internet 
to broadcast his jihadi message together with graphic videos of beheadings and suicide bombings 
catapulted him to a new prominence. 
42. Terrorism analyst Rita Katz, director of the SITE Intelligence Group, explained: 
“While Osama bin Laden traditionally relied on Al Jazeera [satellite television] and the media to 
disseminate his propaganda, Zarqawi went straight to the Internet, which enabled him to produce 
graphic videos that would never have been shown on the mainstream media.”2 
43. At this time, Osama bin-Laden’s al-Qaeda terrorist organization – having carried 
out the 9/11 attacks in the United States3 – was still the dominant symbol of global terrorism. 
44. Back in January 2004, al-Zarqawi had reportedly sought to be recognized by bin-
Laden as part of al-Qaeda’s global jihadi movement, but without success. 
45. But then, according to BBC Security Correspondent Gordon Corera, “[o]ver the 
summer of 2004 with Osama bin Laden yet to appear and Zarqawi carrying out increasingly 
                                                          
2 Scott Shane, “Web Used As Tool of Terror,” Sun Sentinel (June 9, 2006), http://articles.
sun-sentinel.com/2006-06-09/news/0606081728_1_al-zarqawi-al-jazeera-rita-katz. 
3 On September 11, 2001, nineteen al-Qaeda terrorists hijacked four passenger jets and 
flew two of the jets into World Trade Center’s Twin Towers in New York, plunged a third jet 
into the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and crashed the fourth jet in a field in Pennsylvania. The 
attacks (known as “9/11”) altogether killed nearly 3,000 people and injured more than 6,000 
others, and constituted the worst terrorist attack ever on the United States homeland. 
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bloody and high profile attacks, some began to question whether Zarqawi was beginning to rival 
or even succeed bin Laden.”4 
46.  Corera explained that even though al-Zarqawi’s terrorist group was estimated to 
only have between 50 to 500 members at this time, “they exercise[d] an exaggerated degree of 
influence due to their coupling of extreme violence with an acute understanding of the power of 
the media.”5 
47. Al-Zarqawi had become a figure al-Qaeda could not ignore. According to 
terrorism analyst Aaron Y. Zelin, founder of Jihadology.net, not only did bin-Laden not want to 
be “outdone” by al-Zarqawi, “bin-Laden himself wanted to ‘own’ the Iraq jihad as well as 
remain relevant while hiding from the United States.”6 
48. After several months of negotiations, al-Zarqawi received the official recognition 
he sought: he declared allegiance to bin-Laden in an official online statement on October 17, 
2004, and al-Qaeda accepted and publicized al-Zarqawi’s oath to bin-Laden in its online 
magazine Mu’askar al-Battar on October 25, 2004. 
                                                          
4 Gordon Corera, “Unraveling Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda Connection,” Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 
2, Issue 24 (The Jamestown Foundation, Dec. 15, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/
tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=27306&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=179&no_cache=1#.
V49QsjXdlrZ. 
5 Id. 
6 Aaron Y. Zelin, “The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global 
Jihadist Movement,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (June 2014), http://www.
washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pdf. 
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49. On December 27 2004, Al Jazeera television broadcast an audiotape of bin-Laden 
calling al-Zarqawi “the prince of al Qaeda in Iraq” and asking “all our organization brethren to 
listen to him and obey him in his good deeds.”7 
50. Al-Zarqawi changed his group’s name to “Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-
Rafidayn” (“Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Land of Two Rivers [Iraq]”), and it became 
commonly known as “al-Qaeda in Iraq” (“AQI”). 
51. The following is a picture of the AQI flag: 
 
52. The connection with al-Qaeda not only provided al-Zarqawi with greater 
legitimacy among jihadi terrorists, it also gave him essential tangible resources, including access 
to al-Qaeda’s important private donors and recruitment, logistics, and facilitation networks. 
53. By mid-2005, Lt. General David Petraeus assessed that al-Zarqawi had indeed 
attained “an international name ‘of enormous symbolic importance’ . . . on a par with bin-Laden, 
largely because of his group’s proficiency at publicizing him on the Internet.”8 
B. AQI rebrands itself as the Islamic State of Iraq 
54. On June 7, 2006, Al-Zarqawi was killed by a U.S. airstrike. 
55. Al-Zarqawi was succeeded by Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. 
                                                          
7 “Purported bin Laden tape endorses al-Zarqawi,” CNN (Dec. 27, 2004), http://edition.
cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/12/27/binladen.tape/. 
8 Susan B. Glasser and Steve Coll, “The Web as Weapon,” The Washington Post (Aug. 9, 
2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/08/AR2005080801018.
html. 
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56. In October 2006 AQI declared the establishment of the “Islamic State of Iraq” 
(“ad-Dawlah al-‘Iraq al-Islamiyah”) (“ISI”); its goal was to take control of the western and 
central areas of Iraq and turn it into a Sunni Islamic religious state. 
57. The following is a picture of the ISI flag (which also remains the flag of ISIS): 
 
58. Nevertheless, the United States and its allies generally continued to call the group 
“al-Qaeda in Iraq” or AQI. 
59. Building upon al-Zarqawi’s legacy of Internet media jihad, in November 2006 ISI 
announced the establishment of its “al-Furqan Institute for Media Production” (“al-Furqan 
Media”). 
60. Al-Furqan Media’s logo appears as follows: 
 
61. In a press release announcing Al-Furqan Media, ISI stated: “This Institute is a 
milestone on the path of Jihad; a distinguished media that takes the great care in the management 
Case 1:17-cv-00122   Document 1   Filed 01/08/17   Page 13 of 92
-14- 
 
of the conflict with the Crusaders [Western nations] and their tails [sic] and to expose the lies in 
the Crusaders’ media.”9 
62. Following a raid on one of ISI’s al-Furqan Media offices in Samarra, Iraq in June 
2007, Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, a spokesman for the Multinational Forces Iraq, 
described the scope of the office’s operations as follows: 
“[The Samarra office] produced CDs, DVDs, posters, pamphlets, and web-related 
propaganda products and contained documents clearly identifying al Qaeda in 
Iraq[/ISI]’s intent to use media as a weapon. 
. . . 
The building contained 65 hard drives, 18 thumb drives, over 500 CDs and 12 
stand-alone computers . . . In all, this media center had the capacity of 
reproducing 156 CDs in an eight-hour period and had a fully functioning film 
studio. 
. . . 
[U.S. forces also found] a sampling of other propaganda documents: a letter that 
gives instructions on how to use the media to get out the al Qaeda [in Iraq/ISI] 
message most effectively; an al Qaeda [in Iraq/ISI] activity report highlighting car 
bomb, suicide, missile, mortar, sniping and IED [improvised explosive device] 
attacks; a propaganda poster that encourages filming and distributing videos, 
showing al Qaeda [in Iraq/ISI] attacks on coalition forces; and a pamphlet and a 
CD cover of their sniper school.”10 
 
63. On April 18, 2010, ISI leaders Abu Ayyub al-Masri and Abu Omar al-Baghdadi 
were both killed by a joint U.S.-Iraqi raid. 
64. On May 16, 2010, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (“Abu Bakr”) was announced as the 
new leader of ISI. 
                                                          
9 See Bill Roggio, “US targets al Qaeda’s al Furqan media wing in Iraq,” The Long War 
Journal (Oct. 28, 2007), http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/10/us_targets_al_qaedas.
php.  
10 Id. 
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C. ISI expands into Syria to become ISIS 
65. In March 2013, several armed groups fighting against the regime of Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad, including an Islamist group called al-Nusra, took control of the 
Syrian city of Raqqa in northeastern Syria. 
66. On April 8, 2013, ISI leader Abu Bakr publicly announced that AQI/ISI had been 
responsible for secretly authorizing and supporting al-Nusra since it began operating in Syria in 
August 2011, and he declared that ISI and al-Nusra were now officially merged under the name 
“ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil-‘Iraq wash-Sham” (“The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria” or 
“ISIS”11). 
67. The Syrian leader of al-Nusra rejected Abu Bakr’s merger announcement, but 
many of al-Nusra’s foreign-born members (including many of the al-Nusra members in Raqqa) 
willingly shifted their allegiance to ISIS. 
68. Thus, ISIS gained almost overnight a substantial official presence in Syria. 
69. ISIS took advantage of its expanded presence in Syria to drive other armed groups 
from Raqqa and ultimately take control of the city for itself. 
70. By January 2014, ISIS had made Raqqa its capital. 
71. ISIS imposed its own strict sharia rules on Raqqa’s 220,000 inhabitants, and 
declared members of other Muslim sects in the city to be infidels. 
72. ISIS jailed, maimed, or killed its opponents in the city of Raqqa, or those whom 
ISIS accused of engaging in activities ISIS considered anti-Islamic. 
                                                          
11 The Arabic “al-Sham” can be understood as either Syria or the Levant, the latter being 
a historically broader term. The English acronyms “ISIS” and “ISIL” have thus both been used to 
identify the same terrorist organization depending upon translation. ISIS is also known 
(primarily by its detractors) as “DAESH,” an acronym based upon its Arabic name. 
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73. ISIS subjugated the city of Raqqa through terror and fear, with its members 
patrolling the city wearing explosive suicide vests, killing, beheading, and crucifying some of its 
victims and leaving their remains in the public square. 
74. Ultimately, ISIS’s extreme brutality and ruthlessness even led al-Qaeda’s leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri (who succeeded Osama bin-Laden) to disavow ISIS: on February 3, 2014 al-
Zawahiri declared that al-Qaeda had cut all ties with ISIS. 
D. ISIS expands its media and communication resources 
75. In addition to expanding from the “Islamic State in Iraq” to the “Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria” in 2013, ISIS also began a dramatic new expansion of its media production 
capabilities and exploitation of social media. 
76. In March 2013, ISI announced the formation of a second ISI media production 
arm known as “al-I’tisam Media Foundation” (“al-I’tisam Media”), in addition to its already 
well-established al-Furqan Media. 
77. Al-I’tisam Media’s logo appears as follows: 
 
78. In August 2013, ISIS announced the formation of a third media production arm, 
the “Ajnad Foundation for Media Production” (the “Ajnad Foundation”), specializing in audio 
content, including Islamic inspirational songs (“nashids”) that accompany ISIS videos and are 
also released on their own, as well as sermons, Quran readings, and other indoctrination. 
79. The Ajnad Foundation’s logo appears as follows: 
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80. In May 2014, ISIS launched a fourth media production department named “al-
Hayat Media Center” (“al-Hayat Media”) specifically to target Western and non-Arabic-
speaking audiences, producing and distributing material in many languages, including English, 
French, Dutch, German, Turkish, Russian, and more. 
81. Al-Hayat Media’s logo appears as follows: 
 
82. With its highly developed media production departments and various branded 
media outlets, ISIS has been able to create propaganda, recruitment, and operational campaigns 
that are exceptionally professional, sophisticated, and effective. 
83. Amb. Alberto Fernandez, Vice-President of the Middle East Media Research 
Institute (“MEMRI”) and former Coordinator for Strategic Counter-Terrorism Communications 
at the U.S. Department of State, has called ISIS’s media materials, “the gold standard for 
propaganda in terms of its quality and quantity.”12 
                                                          
12 Dr. Erin Marie Saltman & Charlie Winter, “Islamic State: The Changing Face of 
Modern Jihadism,” Quilliam (Nov. 2014), https://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/
uploads/publications/free/islamic-state-the-changing-face-of-modern-jihadism.pdf.  
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84. Essential to the success of its media and terror campaigns—and to the success of 
ISIS—has been ISIS’s use of Twitter to disseminate its materials and messages and execute its 
propaganda, recruitment, and operational campaigns; indeed, all of ISIS’s media production 
departments described above use Twitter. 
E. ISIS proclaims itself an Islamic Caliphate and expands its reach of terror 
85. In March 2014, an ISIS Twitter “hashtag” campaign was launched with the 
message: “We demand Sheikh Al-Baghdadi declare the Caliphate.” 
86. On June 29, 2014, ISIS declared itself a worldwide “Islamic Caliphate”13—an 
Islamic religious state to which all Muslims must submit and pledge fealty—with Abu Bakr as 
its “Caliph” (ruler). ISIS claimed that it is destined to establish its rule worldwide. 
87. Several smaller Islamist terrorist groups have taken control of territory within 
other countries and areas, including Libya, Yemen, and the Sinai Peninsula, and have claimed 
such territories to be “provinces” of the ISIS Caliphate. 
88. ISIS has engaged, and continues to engage, in horrific terrorist atrocities against 
civilians/non-combatants in every area it has operated. 
89. ISIS has kidnapped innocent civilians and made various demands for their release, 
and it has carried out numerous beheadings, crucifixions, public executions, and mass-murders 
of its enemies and people it considers “apostates” or “infidels.” 
90. ISIS has directed and overseen the systematic rape and enslavement of captive 
women and girls, and has conducted a program of genocide against religious and ethnic groups. 
                                                          
13 At this time, ISIS shortened its named to ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah (the “Islamic State” 
or “IS”). For the sake of simplicity, the more commonly used name ISIS is used in this 
Complaint. 
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91. ISIS has enforced its own strict interpretations of Islamic law in the areas it has 
captured, meting out punishments including whipping, amputation, and death to those who fail or 
refuse to comply. 
92. ISIS has paraded captives before cameras and forced them to give statements for 
ISIS propaganda, and it has become infamous for its use of Twitter to broadcast worldwide its 
cruel and ever-unusual executions of captives for their shocking and terror-inducing effect. 
93. ISIS has recruited, and continues to recruit, individuals from all over the world to 
travel to Syria and Iraq for the purpose of joining its ranks and participating in its terrorist 
activities and atrocities. 
94. Tens of thousands of people from around the world have traveled to Syria and 
Iraq to join ISIS and engage in its jihad. 
95. ISIS has indoctrinated and provided training and resources to these recruits, and 
has sent many of them to return to their home countries to carry out terrorist attacks there. 
96. ISIS has also solicited and recruited, and continues to solicit and recruit, 
individuals to remain in their home countries to carry out terrorist attacks there. 
97. These efforts have been particularly directed at citizens of countries participating 
in efforts to suppress and defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq, including the United States, England, 
France, Belgium, and Russia, and ISIS has also provided indoctrination, training and resources to 
these recruits to carry out terrorist attacks. 
98. ISIS’s use of violence against civilians is politically motivated, and intended to 
intimidate and coerce the civilian populations where it carries out such violence, to influence the 
policies of governments, and to affect the policy of governments through kidnapping, 
assassination, and mass destruction. 
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F. Official terrorist designations of ISIS 
99. Not only have ISIS’s claims of statehood and sovereignty been rejected by 
countries worldwide, ISIS has been officially designated as a terrorist organization by the United 
Nations, the European Union, and numerous governments around the world, including the 
United States, Britain, Australia, Canada, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Malaysia, Egypt, India, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Syria, Jordan, and Pakistan. 
100. After al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, 
President Bush issued Executive Order No. 13224 pursuant to the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701 et seq. (“IEEPA”), in which he declared a national 
emergency with respect to the “grave acts of terrorism . . . and the continuing and immediate 
threat of further attacks on United States nationals or the United States.” 
101. Executive Order No. 13224 blocked all property and interests in property of 
“Specially Designated Global Terrorists” (“SDGT’s”), prohibited the provision of funds, goods 
or services for the benefit of SDGTs, and authorized the U.S. Treasury to block the assets of 
individuals and entities that provide support, services, or assistance to, or otherwise associate 
with, SDGTs, as well as their subsidiaries, front organizations, agents, and associates. Executive 
Order No. 13224’s prohibitions remain in effect. 
102. Under the IEEPA, violation of Executive Order No. 13224 is a federal criminal 
offense. See 50 U.S.C. § 1705. 
103. On October 15, 2004, the U.S. Secretary of State designated ISIS, then known as 
“Jam’at al Tawhid wa’al-Jihad,” as an SDGT pursuant to Executive Order No. 13224, and as a 
“Foreign Terrorist Organization” (“FTO”) pursuant to Section 219 of the INI. 69 Fed. Reg. 
61292 (2004). 
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104. Providing material support or resources to a designated FTO is a federal criminal 
offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 
105. These SDGT and FTO designations have been updated from time to time to 
include ISIS’s various aliases including, among other names, “al-Qaeda in Iraq,” “The Islamic 
State of Iraq,” “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria,” and “The Islamic State.” The SDGT and 
FTO designations of ISIS remain in effect today. 
II. ISIS’S EXTENSIVE USE OF TWITTER 
A. Twitter’s Services 
106. Twitter provides a sophisticated yet easy-to-use Internet social media platform 
and related products and services (collectively, “Services”) under the general trade name 
“Twitter.” 
107. Twitter’s Services include use of Twitter’s computer infrastructure, network, 
applications, tools and features, communications services, and more. 
108. Among the specialized tools and features Twitter provides as part of its Services 
are: “TweetDeck” for “real-time tracking, organizing and engaging”; “Curator” for advanced 
locating, filtering, and displaying content; various smartphone applications; other tools for 
monitoring, scheduling, and creating alerts; and more. 
109. Twitter’s “open source” platform enables users to develop and use customized 
“bots” and applications to automate, specialize, and expand their use of Twitter. 
110. Twitter’s communications services can be used to post public messages, or 
privacy settings and “Direct Messages” are available to enable users to communicate privately. 
111. Twitter permits users to create and follow an unlimited number of accounts. 
Case 1:17-cv-00122   Document 1   Filed 01/08/17   Page 21 of 92
-22- 
 
112. Twitter provides its Services only to its registered users, who register by inputting 
identifying information and clicking on a “Sign up” button. 
113. It is not necessary to view any of the “Terms of Service” or other policies or 
conditions in order to proceed with registration. 
114. Twitter provides its Services to its registered users free of charge. 
B. ISIS and Twitter 
115. Twitter has played an essential role in the rise of ISIS to become the most feared 
terrorist organization in the world. 
116. ISIS’s use of violence and threats of violence is calculated and intended to have 
an impact far beyond the harm inflicted upon the individual victims of an attack. 
117. ISIS’s use of violence and threats of violence is part of its program of terrorism, 
designed inter alia to gain attention, instill fear and “terror” in others, send a message, and obtain 
results. 
118. In other words, the physical attack itself and the harm to the individual victims of 
the attack are not the only goal or “end” of ISIS’s terror attacks; rather, ISIS uses terror attacks 
as a “means” to communicate and accomplish its broader objectives. 
119. ISIS uses terrorism as a psychological weapon. 
120. Thus, the messages communicated before, during, and after an ISIS terror attack, 
as well as the attack itself, are essential components of generating the physical, emotional, and 
psychological impact ISIS desire to achieve via the terrorist attack. 
121. The impact and effectiveness of ISIS terrorism, and its motivation to carry out 
more terrorist attacks, are dependent upon ISIS’s ability to communicate its messages and reach 
its intended audiences, without intermediaries and without interference. 
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122. Twitter provides ISIS with a unique and powerful tool of communication that 
enables ISIS to achieve these goals, and it has become an essential and integral part of ISIS’s 
program of terrorism. 
123. Twitter enables ISIS to communicate its messages directly to intended audiences 
without having to go through the filter of commercial media, and it enables ISIS to have greater 
access to the commercial media to further its goals as well. 
124. ISIS not only uses Twitter for recruiting, gathering information, planning, 
inciting, and giving instructions for terror attacks, ISIS also uses Twitter to issue terroristic 
threats, attract attention to its terror attacks and atrocities, instill and intensify fear from terror 
attacks, intimidate and coerce civilian populations, take credit for terror attacks, communicate its 
desired messages about the terror attacks, reach its desired audiences, demand and attempt to 
obtain results from the terror attacks, and influence and affect government policies and conduct. 
125. ISIS thus uses Twitter to actually carry out essential communication components 
of ISIS’s terror attacks. 
126. Simply put, ISIS uses Twitter as a tool and a weapon of terrorism. 
127. Moreover, by allowing ISIS and its affiliates to register for Twitter accounts and 
use Twitter’s Services, Twitter lends a sense of authenticity and legitimacy to ISIS as an 
organization that can operate openly and with impunity, notwithstanding the murderous crimes it 
commits and its status as an illegal terrorist organization. 
128. In defiance of federal criminal laws that prohibit providing services to designated 
terrorists, Twitter enables ISIS terrorists to come out of hiding and present a public face under 
their own brand and logo, and under the brand and logo of an American company: Twitter. 
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129. Twitter’s provision of support to ISIS is not simply a matter of whether ISIS 
abuses its use of Twitter’s Services, or whether Twitter abuses its editorial judgment regarding 
the content of ISIS’s posts; under federal law, Twitter has no discretion about whether to provide 
its Services to ISIS—it is prohibited by law from doing so. 
130. ISIS has used Twitter as an extremely effective means of announcing and 
releasing its propaganda materials, which include full-length videos and glossy magazines that 
present an image of sophistication and advanced media capabilities. 
131. For example, on March 17, 2014, ISIS’s al-I’tisam Media used Twitter to 
announce the release of an hour-long graphic video titled, “The Clanging of the Swords 4,” 
produced by ISIS’s al-Furqan Media, and then used Twitter to publish the video a few hours 
later using links to the video on YouTube. 
132. The terrorism analysis website Jihadica.com reported that within 24 hours of the 
video’s publication, “The Clanging of the Swords 4” had been viewed 56,998 times, with the 
predominate platforms for disseminating the tens of thousands of tweets about the video being 
Twitter’s smartphone applications Twitter for Android and Twitter for iPhone.14 
133. In addition, ISIS uses Twitter to exaggerate its reach and promote an image of 
power and supremacy over other rival groups or enemies, for example by employing multiple 
accounts, Twitter “bots,” automated tweets, and more. 
134. ISIS has mastered the use of Twitter to inflate the image of its size, ferocity, and 
following to the world. 
                                                          
14 Nica Prucha, “Is this the most successful release of a jihadist video ever?” 
Jihadica.com (May 19, 2014), http://www.jihadica.com/is-this-the-most-successful-release-of-a-
jihadist-video-ever/.  
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135. For example, in April 2014, ISIS released an Arabic-language Twitter application 
called the “Dawn of Glad Tidings,” that it advertised as a way to keep up on the latest news 
about ISIS. 
136. Users who downloaded the “Dawn of Glad Tidings” application had to provide 
personal information, and they received automatic tweets from ISIS, which included links, 
hashtags, and images; however, by signing up, users also gave ISIS permission to send tweets 
through their own personal accounts. 
137. Thus, the Twitter account of a “Dawn of Glad Tidings” user would function 
normally most of the time, but would periodically broadcast tweets from ISIS that were also sent 
around at the same time to hundreds or even thousands of other accounts, thus amplifying ISIS’s 
message. 
138. In June 2014, when ISIS advanced upon Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, it 
simultaneously launched a Twitter hashtag campaign (“#AllEyesonISIS”) that registered nearly 
40,000 posts (or “tweets”) in one day. These tweets flooded smartphones and computer screens 
throughout the Arab world with gruesome images of mass executions of Iraqi soldiers and 
atrocities committed by ISIS. The hashtag campaign spread fear and terror among the residents 
of Mosul and Iraqi Army soldiers, giving a sense of inevitability and doom about the advancing 
ISIS terrorists and the atrocities they would soon commit in the city. As a result, the 30,000 Iraqi 
Army soldiers defending Mosul fled, and a band of perhaps 2,000 ISIS terrorists captured the 
city of 1.5 million people. 
139. Shortly after the capture of Mosul, ISIS used Twitter to broadcast images of 
armed ISIS terrorists looking towards Baghdad, with an ISIS flag photo-shopped atop Baghdad 
buildings, again projecting an air of invincibility and inevitability. 
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140. ISIS has used Twitter to raise its prestige among terror groups and even overtake 
older jihadist competitors like al-Qaeda. 
141. Whereas al-Qaeda traditionally used more closed forums to communicate 
internally, ISIS has used Twitter both openly and privately to communicate with its members. 
142. ISIS uses Twitter to disseminate its propaganda in print and video to both 
Muslims and non-Muslims, with the effect of instilling fear and terror in the “non-believers” 
while encouraging others to join in ISIS’s cause. 
143. ISIS also uses Twitter to communicate with ISIS “sympathizers” and to provide 
them with directions as well. 
144. For such purposes, ISIS members are encouraged to use Twitter to post videos or 
pictures of martyred fighters who have been killed in fighting or in suicide operations. 
145. ISIS uses Twitter for intra-group communication as well. 
146. For example, ISIS uses Twitter for tactical and logistical intelligence, with 
members using Twitter to report on operations using videos, pictures, and written statements 
detailing what is happening at a particular location, where enemy forces are stationed, what 
weapons are being used, and the effects of attack operations. 
147. ISIS also uses Twitter to inform members of various rules of behavior, events, 
and even warnings of impending attacks. 
148. ISIS has used Twitter to provide guides to members regarding the clandestine use 
of social media, VPNs, secure mobile networks, and encryption software. 
149. ISIS uses Twitter to give guidance to members regarding cyber-warfare and 
security, such as encouraging the use of certain internet browsers such as Tor, Open Door, and 
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Kaspersky to prevent traces and to open Twitter and other social media accounts without using a 
phone number. 
150. ISIS has used Twitter to encourage members to download identity protection 
software for mobile phones and other methods to increase security on their phones. 
151. ISIS uses Twitter to boast about cyber-attacks and hacking operations, and to 
display information that they were able to obtain. 
152. ISIS thus uses Twitter to instill morale in its members and to show how powerful 
and wide-reaching ISIS’s cyber capabilities are. 
153. ISIS uses Twitter extensively for recruitment of members and followers, and to 
inspire sympathizers around the world to commit terrorist attacks as well. 
154. Twitter enables ISIS to reach out to many thousands of potential recruits with its 
messages and videos. 
155. For example, in June 2014, ISIS’s al-Hayat Media used Twitter to launch and 
propagate a series called the “Mujatweets,” claiming to show “snippets of day-to-day life in the 
‘Islamic State’” to portray life under ISIS as peaceful and normal. 
156. ISIS has also used Twitter to post enticing images of life in ISIS-controlled areas 
and distribute pamphlets such as “Life in Wilayat Nineveh” and “Mosul at Night” that show 
people laughing, enjoying ice cream, and shopping. 
157. ISIS uses Twitter to portray religious followers as happy, content, and smiling. 
158. ISIS’s use of Twitter accounts provide individuals around the world with a means 
to reach out to ISIS directly. 
159. After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate via 
Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities. 
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160. Twitter itself describes Direct Messages as follows: “Direct Messages are the 
private side of Twitter … Communicate quickly and privately with one person or many. Direct 
Messages support text, photos, links, emoji and Tweets, so you can make your point however 
you please … Have a private conversation with anyone on Twitter, even a friend of a friend. 
Direct messages can only be seen between the people included.” 
161. According to FBI Director James Comey: 
“[W]ith the rise of [ISIS], we were suddenly confronted with a terrorist group that 
had … an entirely different way of approaching terrorism. 
 
Their mission was two-pronged: to bring fighters and their families to the Iraq-
Syria border region where they claim their so-called caliphate, and if they 
couldn’t attract fighters to them, they wanted people to kill where they were … 
That was their twin-pronged call, their siren song. Come or kill, come or kill. 
 
The message went out in a way that [bin-Laden’s original] al Qaeda never 
imagined and never could have dreamed of … the threat came from [ISIS] over 
social media. Social media, which had revolutionized the way all of us connect to 
each other, and revolutionized terrorism because [ISIS] could send their twin-
pronged message of come or kill out through the chaotic spider web of Twitter. 
 
In the old days … if someone wanted to consume terrorist propaganda, they went 
to a particular place. They went to a web forum. They went to find where a copy 
of [al-Qaeda’s] Inspire magazine was posted. And if they wanted to talk to a 
terrorist, they sent an e-mail into Inspire magazine and would hope that [a 
terrorist] would e-mail back … [ISIS] changed that model. Now there is no longer 
a place where the media is posted. Now it goes out through this chaotic spider 
web. And it arrives in your pocket, on the device on your hip or in your breast 
pocket, all day long is the twin message. Come or kill. Come or kill. And if you 
want to talk to a terrorist, you don’t need to send an e-mail to anybody. You just 
need to follow that terrorist on Twitter, and then maybe engage in Twitter direct 
messaging with that terrorist. 
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[ISIS] invested in a very slick message that buzzes in pockets all over the world 
… Twitter works as a way to sell books, as a way to promote movies. It works as 
a way to crowd source terrorism, to sell murder.”15 
 
162. According to the Brookings Institution, some ISIS members “use Twitter purely 
for private messaging or covert signaling.”16 
163. ISIS has also used Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities for fundraising and 
operational purposes. 
164. New ISIS members also use Twitter to advertise their membership and terrorist 
activities, and to recruit others to join. 
165. For example, in May 2013, a British citizen who publicly identified himself as an 
ISIS supporter tweeted about landing in Turkey before crossing into Syria to join ISIS in its fight 
against the Syrian regime. 
166. Likewise, in December 2013, the first Saudi Arabian female suicide bomber to 
join ISIS in Syria tweeted her intent to become a martyr for ISIS as she left for Syria. 
167. Through its use of Twitter, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign recruits 
since 2014, including some 4,500 Westerners and 250 Americans. 
168. ISIS has used Twitter to indoctrinate and radicalize potential recruits and 
followers, providing a constant stream of religious teachings, mantras, and images showing the 
                                                          
15 James B. Comey, “Standing Together Against Terrorism and Fear: Tossed by the 
Waves but Never Sunk,” NYPD Shield (Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
standing-together-against-terrorism-and-fear-tossed-by-the-waves-but-never-sunk.  
16 J.M. Berger and Jonathon Morgan, “The ISIS Twitter Census: Defining and describing 
the population of ISIS supporters on Twitter,” The Brookings Institution (Mar. 2015), http://
www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/03/isis-twitter-census-berger-morgan/
isis_twitter_census_berger_morgan.pdf. 
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“truth” of ISIS’s doctrines and the “heresy” of other groups, particularly Christians, Jews, and 
non-Sunni Muslims. 
169. ISIS also uses Twitter to compete with other jihadi terrorist groups. For example, 
ISIS has used Twitter to condemn the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas because of the latter’s 
alliance with predominately-Shiite Iran. 
170. ISIS has used Twitter to exaggerate its expansion territorially by disseminating 
updated maps showing areas ISIS claims to control as well as other regions where other groups 
have allegedly pledged allegiance to ISIS. 
171. ISIS has used Twitter to generate sympathy by showing images of women and 
children allegedly injured or killed by the enemies of ISIS. 
172. ISIS has used the tactic of “hashtag hijacking” on Twitter, by which ISIS will use 
an existing hashtag that is unrelated to ISIS’s topic and flood the hashtag with ISIS’s tweets. 
173. For example, during the 2014 World Cup, ISIS forced its message onto an 
unexpecting audience by using “hashtag hijacking” to mass-tweet the image of a decapitated 
head with the caption: “This is our football, it’s made of skin #WorldCup.”17 
                                                          
17 Selim Algar, “‘This is our ball’: Iraqi jihadis cut off head for World Cup tweet,” New 
York Post (Jun. 13, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/06/13/iraqi-jihadists-joke-about-using-
severed-head-as-soccer-ball. Note that the image copied to this Complaint is taken from the 
foregoing news article with the image of the severed head blurred by editors. The original ISIS 
tweet was uncensored and the severed head was clearly visible. ISIS also tweeted video footage 
of the beheading. Id. 
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174. Tactics such as “hashtag hijacking” not only ensure ISIS’s ability to reach wider 
audiences, but also to give the sense that ISIS is ever-present and cannot be ignored. 
175. ISIS uses Twitter as a psychological weapon to project strength, brutality, 
superiority, and invincibility, and to instill fear, awe, and terror. 
176. ISIS regularly records the executions of large groups of local prisoners in order to 
intimidate and demoralize its opposition. ISIS uses Twitter to make these videos, mixed and 
produced with drama and set to music, “go viral” on the internet and into the mainstream media. 
177. For example, in October 2013, ISIS used Twitter to post a video of a prison break 
at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, and its subsequent execution of Iraqi army officers. 
178. In July, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to tweet images of the beheading of about 75 
Syrian soldiers who had been captured during the Syrian conflict. 
179. In August 2014, an Australian ISIS member tweeted a photograph of his seven-
year-old son holding the decapitated head of a Syrian soldier. 
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180. On August 19, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to disseminate a video in English titled “A 
Message to America,” showing the beheading of American journalist James Foley by a hooded 
man with a British accent, later known as “Jihadi John”: 
 
181. In the video of Foley’s murder, ISIS also showed another captive American, 
Steven Sotloff, and threatened that his fate would be the same if the U.S. did not cease all attacks 
against ISIS. 
182. On September 2, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release a video titled “A Second 
Message to America,” showing the beheading of Steven Sotloff: 
 
183. The video of Sotloff’s murder was followed shortly after by similar videos of 
beadings released by ISIS using Twitter, including the following in 2014: 
a. David Haines, a British aid worker, video released September 13, 2014; 
b. Alan Henning, a British aid worker, video released October 3, 2014; and 
c. Peter Kassig, an American aid worker (video shows that he was beheaded 
and the beheading of Syrian soldiers), video released November 16, 2014; 
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184. On February 3, 2015, ISIS’s al-Furqan Institute used Twitter to disseminate a 
video titled “Healing a Believer’s Chest,” showing Jordanian pilot Mu’adh Al-Kasasbeh, who 
had been captured by ISIS, burned alive in a cage. The following are scenes from that video: 
 
185. On February 15, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release a video titled “A Message 
Signed With Blood To The Nation Of The Cross,” showing the beheading of 21 Coptic Christian 
men ISIS had captured in Libya: 
 
186. ISIS has also used Twitter to release videos of other cruel executions, including 
numerous beheadings and crucifixions, discharging explosives attached to captives, slowly 
lowering caged captives into water to drown, and more. 
187. ISIS’s ability to force upon the world its message, evidence of its atrocities, and 
the image of its continued vitality using Twitter, not only intensifies the intimidation it creates, 
but also motivates and emboldens its members and followers to carry out even more terrorist 
attacks. 
188. ISIS also uses Twitter to raise funds for its terrorist activities. 
189. David Cohen, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and 
Financial Intelligence, has described ISIS “donor networks” that involve “bundlers” who use 
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social media to solicit funds in Persian Gulf states and deliver the funds to ISIS in Iraq and Syria. 
Asked whether these donations received through social media involve “small-dollar donations 
[or] big-dollar donations,” Under Secretary Cohen replied: 
“Look, I think it’s all of the above. You see these appeals on Twitter in particular 
from well-known terrorist financiers, ones that we’ve designated, that have been 
designated at the U.N., asking for donations to be made to -- and they’re quite 
explicit -- that these are to be made to [ISIS] for their military campaign.”18 
 
190. The Financial Action Task Force (“FATF”) has reported that “individuals 
associated with ISIL have called for donations via Twitter and have asked the donors to contact 
them through Skype.”19 
191. In the spring of 2014, a similar Twitter campaign asked ISIS followers to “support 
the Mujahideen [holy warriors] with financial contribution via the following reliable accounts,” 
and provided contact information for how to make the requested donations. 
192. In other Twitter fundraising campaigns, ISIS has posted photographs of cash, gold 
bars, and luxury cars that it received from donors, as well as weapons purchased with the 
proceeds. 
193. ISIS uses Twitter to inflame Muslim emotions and incite violence against non-
Muslims, and to glorify terrorist “martyrs” and jihad. 
                                                          
18 “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Josh Earnest, 10/23/2014,” The White House, Office 
of the Press Secretary (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/10/23/
press-briefing-press-secretary-josh-earnest-10232014. 
19 “Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” 
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (Feb. 2015), http://www.ilsole24ore.com/pdf2010/Editrice/
ILSOLE24ORE/ILSOLE24ORE/Online/_Oggetti_Correlati/Documenti/Notizie/2015/02/
Financing.pdf. 
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194. ISIS uses Twitter to provide hyperlinks to other online sites, postings, media, and 
other social network media, as well as to provide updates to new ISIS Twitter accounts and 
hashtag references. 
195. Thus, ISIS uses Twitter as a platform from which followers can access not only 
Twitter postings and comments, but also other websites, Facebook pages, YouTube content, and 
other online social network media. 
196. ISIS uses Twitter as a means to communicate its messages to the broader news 
media, including Twitter accounts and posts in English, French, and other languages. 
197. ISIS uses Twitter to monitor news, police operations, intelligence information, 
terrorism investigators, and others sources of information that may be useful to ISIS in planning 
and carrying out attacks. 
198. ISIS members will often open Twitter accounts solely for the purpose of 
following other Twitter accounts, whether accounts of other ISIS members, leaders, enemies, 
news, or police and intelligence accounts, and more. 
199. ISIS members use Twitter accounts to build and maintain networks. 
200. Twitter is especially useful to ISIS because, among other things, it is provided 
free of charge, allows unlimited accounts and usage, offers the ability to push content to an 
enormous number of users instantaneously, provides the ability to communicate without 
disclosing location, enables like-minded users to connect and communicate, affords both public 
and private communications, and integrates other social media platforms and services. 
201. Moreover, the money ISIS saves by using Twitter frees up funds for Twitter to 
devote to even more terrorist attacks. 
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202. In all of these ways and more, Twitter’s Services have played an essential role in 
enabling ISIS to grow, develop, and project itself as the most feared terrorist organization in the 
world. 
203. The technological capabilities that Twitter’s Services give to ISIS have had an 
enormous impact on ISIS’s methods and success in recruiting, indoctrination, training, gathering 
and disseminating intelligence, conducting terrorist operations, and engaging in psychological 
warfare. 
204. Twitter’s Services thus substantially contributed to ISIS’s ability to carry out 
more terrorist operations, including the Paris Attack and the Brussels Attack, and the nature and 
expected consequence of providing these resources to ISIS was that they would be used to plan 
and carry out terrorist activity. 
205. Prior to these attacks, many were calling upon Twitter to cease providing its 
Services to ISIS for just that reason; indeed, by the time of the Paris Attack, French authorities 
were not wondering whether ISIS would carry out such a terrorist attack in France, but when it 
would do so. 
III. ISIS’S NOVEMBER 13, 2015 PARIS ATTACK AND MARCH 22, 2016 
BRUSSELS ATTACK 
 
A. Introduction 
206. On November 13, 2015, ISIS carried out a horrific terrorist attack in Paris, 
France, murdering 130 people, including Nohemi Gonzalez, and injuring hundreds more (the 
“Paris Attack”). 
207. On March 22, 2016, ISIS carried out another horrendous terrorist attack in 
Brussels, Belgium, murdering 32 people, including Alex Pinczowski and his sister Sascha 
Pinczowski, and also injuring hundreds more (the “Brussels Attack”). 
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208. These two terrorist attacks were intended: a) to intimidate and coerce the civilian 
population of France, Belgium, the United States, and other countries engaged in activities 
against ISIS; b) to influence the policies of these governments by intimidation and coercion; and 
c) to affect the conduct of these governments by mass destruction, assassination, and kidnapping. 
209. Indeed, a major component of these attacks was the messaging disseminated by 
ISIS prior to, during, and after the events, in which ISIS stated its reasons for committing the 
terrorist attacks against these countries’ civilians. 
210. These attacks involved extensive planning, recruiting, organization, training, 
preparation, coordination, and funding. 
211. They also involved private communications between ISIS members as well as 
public communications to intensify the desired fear and intimidation. 
212. ISIS used Twitter’s services to facilitate and accomplish all of these things. 
B. ISIS vs. the United States, France, and their Allies 
213. On June 29, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release an audio message from ISIS 
spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani (“al-Adnani”) titled “This is the Promise of Allah 
[God]”: 
   
214. In the July 29, 2014 message, al-Adnani announced the establishment of a 
worldwide Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr as the new Caliph. Al-Adnani stated that 
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establishing the Caliphate had become a collective obligation for all Muslims and that the 
Islamic world would be sinning if it did not do so. He also stated that Muslims everywhere must 
pledge allegiance to the Caliph, support him and obey him. Al-Adani urged ISIS’s members to 
remain united, adding that if anyone tried to break away, the members should “split his head with 
bullets and empty its insides, whoever he may be.” 
215. On July 1, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release an audio message from Abu Bakr 
titled “A Message to the Mujahidin [holy warriors] and the Islamic Ummah [Nation] in the 
[Muslim] Month of Ramadan”: 
   
216. In his July 1, 2014 audio message, Abu Bakr called upon all Muslims to take up 
arms, engage in jihad, and emigrate to the new Caliphate. He further urged Muslims to 
“[s]upport the religion of Allah through jihad in the path of Allah” and “[t]errify the enemies of 
Allah and seek death in the places where you expect to find it.” 
217. On September 21, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release a new audio message from 
al-Adnani titled “Verily Your Lord is Ever Watchful”: 
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218. In his September 21, 2014 message, al-Adnani urged ISIS supporters worldwide 
to perform terrorist attacks against countries that participated in fighting against ISIS, and in 
particular, against the United States, France, and other European nations. The following are 
translated excerpts from this message: 
“[To the U.S. and its allies:] We promise you that this campaign will be your last 
and it will collapse and fail, just as all your other campaigns collapsed. But this 
time, when the war ends we will be the ones to invade your countries, whereas 
you will no longer invade [ours]. We will invade your Rome, break your Cross 
and enslave your women, with Allah’s help. This is His promise and he will not 
break it until it is realized. And if we do not achieve this, our sons or grandsons 
will, and they will sell your sons and grandsons as slaves. 
. . . 
[To American and Europeans:] The Islamic State did not launch a war against 
you, as your lying governments and your media claim. You are the ones who 
initiated hostilities against us, and the [side] that initiates hostilities is the evil one. 
You will pay [for it] dearly when your economies collapse. You will pay dearly 
when your sons are sent to fight us and return crippled and damaged, in coffins or 
as lunatics. You will pay when each of you feels afraid to travel abroad. You will 
pay when you walk the streets in trepidation, for fear of Muslims. You will not be 
safe in your own beds. You will pay the price when your Crusader war fails, and 
then we invade the very heart of your countries. 
. . . 
[To Muslims:] O monotheist, don’t sit out this war, wherever you may be. 
[Attack] the tyrants’ soldiers, their police and security forces, their intelligence 
[forces] and collaborators. Cause them to lose sleep, make their lives miserable, 
and cause them to be preoccupied with their own [problems]. If you are able to 
kill an American or European infidel – particularly any of the hostile, impure 
Frenchmen – or an Australian or a Canadian, or any [other] infidel enemy from 
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the countries that have banded against the Islamic State, then put your trust in 
Allah and kill him, by any way or means. Do not consult anyone and do not seek 
a fatwa [religious ruling] from anyone. It is immaterial if the infidel is a 
combatant or a civilian. Their sentence is one; they are both infidels, both 
enemies. The blood of both is permitted . . . The best thing to do would be to kill 
any French or American infidel or any of their allies . . . If you cannot [detonate] a 
bomb or [fire] a bullet, arrange to meet alone with a French or an American 
infidel and bash his skull in with a rock, slaughter him with a knife, run him over 
with your car, throw him off a cliff, strangle him, or inject him with poison. Don’t 
stand by, helpless and abject . . . If you are incapable even of this – then spit in his 
face. And if you refuse [to do] this while your brothers are being bombed and 
killed and their lives and property are under attack everywhere, then examine 
your faith. This is a serious matter you face, for the Islamic faith is predicated 
upon the principle of loyalty to Muslims and hostility toward infidels.”20 
 
219. On October 14, 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release a video message, titled 
“Message of the Mujahid 3,” even directing one of the tweets directly to French President 
Hollande: 
   
220. The Message of the Mujahid 3 video was directed to the people of France, and 
featured a French-speaking member of ISIS in the driver’s seat of a car with a rifle threatening 
France with terrorist attacks and calling upon Muslims to carry out attacks: 
                                                          
20 See “Responding To U.S.-Led Campaign, IS Spokesman Calls To Kill Westerners, 
Including Civilians, By Any Means Possible,” The Middle East Research Institute (MEMRI) 
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.memrijttm.org/content/view_print/blog/7825. 
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221. The following is a translation of excerpts from the French-speaker’s statement in 
the Message of the Mujahid 3 video: 
“We will give a message to France over the bombing in Iraq and Syria. We have 
warned, you are at war against the Islamic State. We are people to whom the 
victory will be assured with the help God. Now you have been warned. 
. . . 
You have so many murders and killings as did our dear brother Mohamed Merah. 
You were afraid of a brother, there will be thousands in the future. 
. . . 
This is a message to all Muslims of France. Enjoy and see what happens in the 
world. They gathered against us. Why, because we are defending Islam and 
because we want to apply the law of Allah. . . . You say that we’re the criminals. 
But they’re the cowards who drop bombs in their sky. We will take revenge for all 
the brothers and all the civilians who were killed. 
. . . 
You will not be safe anywhere in France or in other countries. We will make 
appeals to all brothers who live in France to kill any civilian. You will never be 
safe. All murders you committed, you will regret it.” 
 
C. Recruiting and Planning 
222. Abdelhamid Abaaoud (“Abaaoud”), was a dual Belgian-Moroccan national born 
in Brussels in 1987. 
223. Between 2006 and 2012, Abaaoud was arrested several times, resulting in various 
light sentences including community service, probation, and jail time. 
224. After his release from jail in September 2012, Abaaoud became involved in an 
Islamic group that was recruiting for jihad in Syria. 
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225. In March 2013, Abaaoud traveled to Syria via Egypt with six others from 
Belgium. Abaaoud joined ISIS and took on the names “Abou Omar al-Soussi” and “Abu Omar 
al-Beljiki.” 
226. Abaaoud returned to Belgium about September 2013. 
227. According to investigators, while back in Belgium, Abaaoud received a telephone 
call from ISIS member Mehdi Nemmouche, a French national who is the prime suspect of the 
May 2014 attack in which an ISIS terrorist murdered four people at a Jewish museum in 
Brussels. 
228. In December 2013, Abaaoud opened a Twitter account (the “Abaaoud Account”), 
which he used to follow other ISIS Twitter accounts. This account remains open until today.21 
229. The Abaaoud Account shows that Abaaoud had connected his account to at least 
14 other Twitter accounts to automatically follow those accounts, and that the Abaaoud Account 
was similarly “followed” by a number of other ISIS-related Twitter accounts as well. 
230. A number of the Twitter accounts that Abaaoud automatically followed on the 
Abaaoud Account were ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts that displayed the ISIS flag and insignia. 
231. Several of the Twitter accounts that Abaaoud automatically followed promoted 
ISIS’s extremist religious indoctrination and ideology, religious and ethnic hatred, and acts of 
terrorism and violence against civilians. 
232. Several of the Twitter accounts that Abaaoud automatically followed were 
accounts of female ISIS members and recruits. 
                                                          
21 Because the Abaaoud Account remains open, Plaintiff’s have not included specific 
identification information for this Twitter account in this publicly filed Complaint. 
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233. In January 2014, Abaaoud brought his 13-year-old brother Younes out of 
Brussels, and the two traveled to Syria via a flight from Cologne to Istanbul. 
234. In early 2014, Abaaoud posted on his Facebook page a video in which he appears 
as an ISIS fighter in Syria describing his role as a jihadi [“holy warrior”]; the video also included 
profiles and statements by other ISIS jihadis and was designed to glorify jihad [“holy war”] and 
recruit more ISIS members to come to Syria and Iraq. Upon information and belief, the video 
was also distributed via Twitter. 
235. In October 2014, ISIS used Twitter to release a list of ISIS members who were 
recently killed in battle, and Abaaoud’s name was included in the list. The list also included 
other known associates of Abaaoud. Belgian counterterrorism officials reported that Abaaoud’s 
name was likely included in the list as a means of faking his death so he could avoid security 
services and travel more easily to Europe to coordinate terrorist plots. 
236. On January 15, 2015, Belgian commandos thwarted an ISIS terrorist plot (the 
“Verviers Plot”) when they raided a safe house in Verviers, Belgium, killing ISIS terrorists 
Sofiane Amghar (“Amghar”) and Khalid Ben Larbi (“Larbi”), and arresting a third conspirator. 
237. In the safe house, police found AK-47 assault rifles, components of the explosive 
TATP, GoPro cameras, and police uniforms. 
238. Officials reported that the Verviers Plot had included a planned beheading of a 
police officer that was to be filmed. 
239. Police investigators determined that Abaaoud had been in contact with the three 
Verviers terrorists via cellphone in Greece at the time of the raid, and was involved in the 
Verviers Plot. 
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240. In February 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release the seventh issue of its online 
English-language magazine Dabiq: 
   
 
241. ISIS’s Dabiq Issue 7 featured an interview of Abaaoud, and included a 
photograph of Abaaoud (a/k/a Abu Umar al-Baljiki) walking with Amghar (a/k/a Abu Khalid al-
Baljiki) and Larbi (a/k/a Abuz-Zubayr al-Baljiki), the ISIS terrorists who were supposed to carry 
out the Verviers Plot but who were killed in the Verviers raid: 
     
242. In the Dabiq Issue 7 interview, Abaaoud insinuated that he had been in Belgium 
himself, stating: “I was able to leave and come to Sham [Syria] despite being chased after by so 
many intelligence agencies. My name and picture were all over the news yet I was able to stay in 
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their homeland, plan operations against them, and leave safely when doing so became 
necessary.” 
243. On February 11, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release its second issue of its online 
French-language magazine Dar al-Islam, with the cover-line “May Allah [God] Curse France”: 
 
244. ISIS’s Dar al-Islam online French-language magazine is dedicated to recruiting 
French-speaking members for ISIS and promoting attacks against France and other western 
countries. 
245. Dar al-Islam Issue 2 was released shortly after a series of Islamist terrorist attacks 
in Paris had taken place from January 7-9, 2015. In one attack, two “al-Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula” (“AQAP”) terrorists shot and killed 11 civilians and a police officer and wounded 11 
others in a shooting attack at the office of the Charlie Hebdo satire magazine. Immediately 
afterward, ISIS terrorist Amedy Coulibaly (“Coulibaly”) shot and killed a police officer and a 
jogger, and then killed four Jewish shoppers and took others hostage at a Hypercacher kosher 
supermarket. 
246. Dar al-Islam Issue 2 praised and justified these attacks, and featured pictures of 
Coulibaly and an interview of his wife, Hayat Boumeddiene. 
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247. The issue also called for more terrorist attacks against France and other western 
countries. One article in this issue included the following statement: 
The disbeliever states have understood the consequences of the return of the 
Caliphate: the end of the domination by the Jews, the Crusaders and their allies. 
Every sincere Muslim must migrate to one of the regions of the Islamic State, the 
land of Islam, and leave the land of disbelief led by the worst tawaghit [tyrants] of 
this world, who constantly war against our community. The time has come for the 
believers to go forth, to recover the land, and not to let these tyrants rest for one 
second. . . . France needs to mourn its dead as we mourn our own; may they see 
the blood of their own people flow like we see that of our own. 
 
248. In June 2015, French police took an ISIS recruit named Nicholas Moreau 
(“Moreau”) into custody after he was deported from Turkey. 
249. Under interrogation, Moreau told the police that Abaaoud was “the principal 
commander of future attacks in Europe,” and had been given the task by ISIS of examining the 
background of potential recruits for those attacks.22 
250. After arresting Moreau, French police arrested another ISIS recruit in 2015 named 
Reda Hame (“Hame”) before he was able to carry out a planned terrorist attack. 
251. During his interrogation on August 13, 2015, Hame told the police that in June 
2015 Abaaoud had given Hame hands-on training in a park in Raqqa on the use of Kalashnikov 
assault rifles and grenades. 
252. Hame told polie that Abaaoud directed him to choose “an easy target, like a group 
of people, a concert for example, where there is a crowd,” and instructed Hame that after 
carrying out the attack, he should wait for police to arrive and “die while killing the hostages.” 
                                                          
22 Paul Cruickshank, “The inside story of the Paris and Brussels attacks,” CNN (Mar. 30, 
2016), http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/30/europe/inside-paris-brussels-terror-attacks/index.html. 
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253. Hame said that Abaaoud told him that “if lots of civilians were hit, the foreign 
policy of France would change.” 
254. Asked by police whether he was aware of any pending attacks, Hame replied: 
“All I can tell you is that it’s going to happen soon. It’s a veritable factory over there – they are 
really looking to hit France or Europe.”23 
D. The Team of ISIS Terrorists Gather in Preparation of the Attack 
255.  By the end of September 2015, Abaaoud had again slipped back into Europe. 
256 In early September 2015, Abaaoud’s childhood friend named Salah Abdeslam 
(“Abdeslam”) traveled to Hungary to pick up two ISIS members, Mohammed Belkaid 
(“Belkaid”) and Najim Laachraoui (“Laachraoui”), who had arrived from Syria using fake 
identities. 
257. On September 9, 2015, Abdeslam, driving a rented Mercedes, was checked by 
authorities at the Hungarian-Austrian border on his way back to Belgium with Belkaid and 
Laachraoui. 
258. On October 3, 2015, two Iraqi ISIS members arrived at the Greek island of Leros 
on a boat with nearly 200 migrants. 
259. Using fake Syrian passports, the two Iraqis registered as refugees, took a ferry to 
Athens, and then traveled through the Balkans, Hungary, and Austria to meet the other ISIS 
conspirators in Belgium. 
260. The group of ISIS conspirators that gathered together in Belgium in preparation 
for the Paris Attack included at least twelve people: 
a. Abaaoud (a/k/a Abou Omar al-Belgiki, a/k/a Abou Omar al-Soussi); 
                                                          
23 Id. 
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b. Belkaid; 
c. Laachraoui (a/k/a Abu Idriss); 
d. Abdeslam; 
e. an Iraqi with the nom de guerre Ukachah al-Iraqi; 
f. an Iraqi with the nom de guerre Ali al-Iraqi; 
g. Bilal Hadfi (“Hadfi”) (a/k/a Abu Mujaed al-Baljiki); 
h. Abdeslam’s brother, Brahim Abdeslam (“Brahim”) (a/k/a Abu Qaqa al-
Baljiki); 
i. Chakib Akrouh (“Akrouh”) (a/k/a Dhul-Qarayn al-Baljiki); 
j. Ismael Omar Mostefai (“Mostefai”) (a/k/a Abu Rayyan al-Faransi); 
k. Samy Amimour (“Amimour”) (a/k/a Abu Qital al-Faransi); and 
l. Foued Mohamed-Agged (“Agged”) (a/k/a Abu Fu’ad al-Faransi, a/k/a 
Abou Foued Mouhajir). 
261. Abaaoud appears to have been the operational leader of the ten ISIS terrorists who 
would execute the Paris Attack. 
262. Belkaid and Laachraoui were apparently senior ISIS members who would remain 
in Belgium and communicate with the attackers via cellphone to coordinate the attacks. 
263. Laachraoui was also the bomb-maker who prepared the TATP explosive suicide-
belts that were worn and used by the ISIS terrorists who would execute the Paris Attack. 
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264. In December 2012, Laachraoui opened a Twitter account (the “Laachraoui 
Account”), which he used to follow and communicate with others, including ISIS Twitter 
accounts. This account remains open until today.24 
265. The Laachraoui Account shows that Laachraoui had connected his account to at 
least 41 other Twitter accounts to automatically follow those account, and that the Laachraoui 
Account was similarly “followed” by a number of other ISIS-related Twitter accounts as well. 
266. A number of the Twitter accounts that Laachraoui followed and communicated 
with on the Laachraoui Account were ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts that displayed the ISIS 
flag and insignia. Several of these accounts promoted ISIS’s extremist religious indoctrination 
and ideology, religious and ethnic hatred, and acts of terrorism and violence against civilians. 
267. From approximately early September 2015 until shortly before the Paris Attack, 
the ISIS conspirators of the Paris Attack gathered in three safe houses in Belgium, including a 
large villa rented by Laachraoui. 
268. Between November 11 and November 13, 2015, the ISIS members who were to 
execute the Paris Attack moved from Belgium to Paris, where they divided themselves between 
two locations: a hotel and a rented house. 
E. The Paris Attack 
269. On the night of November 13, 2015, the ISIS terrorists in Paris split into three 
groups: one group set out in a black Renault Clio driven by Abdeslam, with Hadfi and the two 
Iraqis (the three “Stadium Attackers”) as passengers; a second group travelled in a black Seat 
Leon driven by Abaaoud, with Brahim and Akrouh as passengers (the three “Café Attackers”); 
                                                          
24 Because the Laachraoui Account remains open, Plaintiff’s have not included specific 
identification information for this Twitter account in this publicly filed Complaint. 
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and the third group consisting of Mostefai, Amimour, and Agged (the three “Bataclan 
Attackers”) rode in a black Volkswagen Polo. 
270. Shortly before 9:00 p.m., Abdeslam dropped the Stadium Attackers off outside 
the Stade de France (the “National Stadium”) in Paris, and then drove away. 
271. French President Francois Hollande was at the National Stadium at the time. 
272. Beginning at about 9:05 p.m., a security guard at Gate R blocked one of the Iraqis 
four times trying to sneak into the stadium. 
273. At about 9:20 p.m., one of the Iraqi suicide bombers (with a fake Syrian passport 
in the name Ahmad al Mohammad) blew himself up outside Gate D, killing one other person. 
Hadfi was on the phone with Abaaoud at the time. 
274. At about 9:20 p.m., Abaaoud was driving a black Seat Leon with Brahim and 
Akrouh as passengers on the Rue Bichat towards Paris’s café district. 
275. At about 9:25 p.m., a car blocked Abaaoud’s path on Rue Bichat. Five shots were 
fired from the Seat Leon, killing the driver of the blocking car. 
276. Abaaoud then stopped the car in the middle of the road and turned on the hazard 
lights. Abaaoud, Brahim, and Akrouh got out of the car shouting “Allahu Akbar” and, using 
Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifles, they opened fire on people at the Petit Cambodge Cambodian 
restaurant on Rue Bichat and the La Carillon bar on the other side of the road, killing 13 people. 
277. The three terrorists got back into the black Seat Leon car and drove on. 
278. At about 9:30 p.m., the second Iraqi suicide bomber exploded outside Gate H at 
the national stadium. Fortunately, no one besides the bomber was killed. 
279. At about 9:32 p.m., the black Seat Leon stopped again. Abaaoud, Brahim, and 
Akrouh got out of the car and, shouting “Allahu Akbar,” they opened fire at patrons at the Casa 
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Nostra pizzaria and Bonne Biere café near the Place de la Republique square. This time they 
murdered five people, before jumping back into the car. 
280. At about 9:36 p.m., Abaaoud, Brahim, and Akrouh opened fire at the La Belle 
Equipe café on Rue de Charrone, killing 19 people, including 23-year-old Nohemi Gonzalez, an 
American student in Paris on a study-abroad program. Most of those who were murdered at this 
café were sitting on the outdoor terraces. A witness reported that the three terrorists did not speak 
to each other as they calmly sprayed bullets at the cafés and at cars travelling down the road. 
281. The black Seat Leon then sped to a new location. 
282. At about 9:40 p.m., Abaaoud dropped off Brahim, who was wearing a hooded 
jacket over several layers of clothing, at the Comptoir Voltaire café. Brahim entered the covered 
interior terrace of the café, smiled at the patrons, apologized for interrupting their dinner, and 
blew himself up. 
283. Abaaoud and Akrouh next drove toward the Montreuil suburb of Paris, where 
they abandoned the black Seat Leon car. 
284. At about 9:40 p.m., Mostefai, Amimour, and Agged, driving a black Volkswagen 
Polo, pulled up in front of the Bataclan Theatre concert hall in Paris and parked the car. 
285. At about 9:42 p.m., one of the three terrorists in the black Volkswagen Polo sent a 
text message on a Samsung smartphone to a cellphone in Brussels: “We’re getting going; we’re 
starting.” He then tossed the phone into a trash can near the entrance of the concert hall. 
286. Police recovered the Samsung smartphone from the trash can after the Paris 
Attack, and determined that the text message was received in Brussels on a cell phone used by 
Belkaid. Police also determined that a second cellphone in Brussels, used by either Belkaid or 
Laachraoui, was also communicating with Hadfi and Abaaoud during the Paris Attack. 
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287. The three Bataclan attackers first killed three people outside the concert hall, then 
went in and moved to the concert floor, shooting people and shouting “Allahu Akbar.” As one 
terrorist fired his weapon, another reloaded so they could kill as many as possible. The third 
terrorist stood at the emergency exit and attacked people who attempted to escape. 
288. The terrorists spoke French, telling the wounded on the floor: “Anybody who 
moves, I’m going to kill.” 
289. At about 9:50 p.m., Hadfi, the third national stadium suicide bomber, exploded 
next to a McDonald’s restaurant nearby the stadium, injuring more than 50 people. 
290. After the Bataclan attackers’ initial wave of killing, they briefly stopped and were 
heard to say: “Where is the singer? Where are those Yanks? It’s an American group, you’re 
bombing us with the Americans, so we’re going to hit the Americans and you.” 
291. The Bataclan terrorists told those on the floor that they had been dispatched from 
Syria by ISIS to carry out the attack to avenge French airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. 
292. At about 10:00 p.m., two French police officers arrived at the Bataclan hall and 
shot Amimour. As Amimour fell to the floor, he detonated his suicide vest. 
293. Mostefai and Agged took some of the surviving concert-goers and herded them 
into a corridor inside the Bataclan building to hold as hostages. 
294. At about 10:45 p.m., French “RAID” commandos arrived and began 
communicating with Mostefai and Agged. The two terrorists in the Bataclan threatened to 
execute their hostages unless they received a signed paper promising that France would leave 
Muslim lands. 
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295. In the meantime, Abaaoud had taken the metro back into Paris to coordinate the 
Bataclan attack. He was seen by a witness outside the concert hall yelling orders into a hands-
free cellphone. 
296. Just after midnight, the RAID commandos stormed the concert hall, rescuing the 
hostages alive. Mostefai and Agged were both shot by police, and at least one of them managed 
to detonate his suicide vest. 
297. By the end of the Paris Attack, the ISIS terrorists had murdered 130 people and 
injured nearly 400. 
298. Seven of the ten ISIS terrorist attackers were dead, leaving only Abaaoud, 
Akrouh, and Abdeslam alive. 
299. The Paris Attack was the deadliest attack on France since World War II and the 
deadliest in the European Union since the Madrid train bombings in 2004. 
F. The Aftermath of the Paris Attacks 
300. Abaaoud and Akrouh remained in Paris that night, where they made a makeshift 
camp in a small wooded area near a highway overpass. 
301. With assistance from Belkaid and Laachraoui in Brussels, Abaaoud’s female 
cousin Hasna ait Boulahcen (“Boulahcen”) was guided via cellphone to the wooded hiding place 
of Abaaoud and Akrouh, where she met with them on November 15, 2015. 
302. On the evening of November 17, 2015, Boulahcen picked up Abaaoud and 
Akrouh and took them to a safe-house in Saint-Denis. However, the French police had received a 
tip about Boulahcen’s contact with Abaaoud and Akrouh from a confidential informant. 
303. In the early hours of November 18, 2015, French RAID commandos moved 
against the Saint-Denis safe-house where Abaaoud, Akrouh, and Boulahcen were now located. 
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The resulting firefight was so intense that a ceiling caved in. Akrouh detonated his suicide belt 
and Akrouh, Abaaoud, and Boulahcen were all killed. 
304. Meanwhile, Abdeslam was still at large. 
G. The Brussels Attack 
305. After dropping Hadfi and the two Iraqi suicide bombers at the national stadium to 
begin the attack on November 13, 2015, Abdeslam had driven away to the 18th district of Paris, 
where he abandoned his Renault Clio rental car, and he then made his way to the southern suburb 
of Montrouge, where he threw his own suicide belt into a trash can. At about 11:00 p.m. that 
night, he called a friend from Brussels to pick him up and take him back to Belgium. 
306. After returning to Belgium, Abdeslam met up with Belkaid and the two ISIS 
members moved to another safe-house in Brussels. 
307. On March 15, 2016, police approached the safe-house and three terrorists opened 
fire. As Belkaid continued to fire at police, Abdeslam and the third terrorist escaped. Belkaid was 
killed by a police sniper. Inside the safe-house police found a Kalashnikov assault rifle, 
ammunition, an ISIS flag, and detonators. 
308. Three days later, on March 18, 2016, Abdeslam was located and arrested in 
Molenbeek, Belgium. 
309. ISIS had been planning to carry out another large-scale terrorist attack in France, 
but with the death of Belkaid and the arrest of Abdeslam and concern that investigators may 
intervene, the ISIS commanders decided to accelerate the timing of an attack and to carry it out 
in Brussels instead. 
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310. ISIS leaders believed to have been involved in planning and directing the Paris 
and Brussels attacks include, among others, Abdelilah Himich (a/k/a “Abo Souleymane”), 
French converts Jean Michel and Fabian Clain, and another individual known as “Abu Ahmad.” 
311. Shortly before 8:00 a.m. on Tuesday, March 22, 2016, three ISIS terrorists exited 
a taxi at the Zaventem Airport in Brussels, Belgium. The three were Laachraoui (the Paris Attack 
bomb-maker), Ibrahim el Bakraoui (“Bakraoui”), and Mohamed Abrini (“Abrini”), a childhood 
friend of Abdeslam. 
312. The three ISIS terrorists entered the airport pushing luggage carts with large 
luggage bags packed with explosives, nails and screws, on their carts. 
313. At approximately 7:58 a.m., Bakraoui detonated his bomb near check-in row 11 
in the Departures Hall of the airport, which had counters for Delta Airlines. 
314. About ten seconds later, Laachraoui detonated his bomb near check-in row 2, 
which had counters for Air Canada, among other airlines. 
315. The third terrorist at the airport, Abrini, abandoned his bomb and fled the airport; 
he was later identified wearing a light-colored jacket and a hat in a surveillance video that 
recorded the three terrorists entering the airport pushing the luggage carts. 
316. At about 9:10 a.m., during the height of the morning rush, another ISIS terrorist, 
Khalid el Bakraoui (“Khalid”) (Bakraoui’s brother), carried out another suicide bombing in the 
second car of a train at the Maelbeek subway station in downtown Brussels; the subway station is 
near many European Union buildings, including the European Parliament, the European 
Commission headquarters, and the Council of the European Union. 
317. Besides the three suicide bombers, the Brussels attacks killed 33 people and 
injured more than 300 others, many critically. 
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318. Among those killed in the suicide bombings at the Brussels airport was decedent 
Alexander Pinczowski and his sister Sascha. 
319. Abrini was subsequently arrested on April 8, 2016, and he admitted to being the 
terrorist seen wearing a hat in the airport surveillance video from the morning of the attack.  
H. ISIS Tweets the Paris and Brussels Attacks 
320. According to reports, at least four ISIS-linked social media accounts began 
sharing messages 72 hours before the Paris Attack that included images of weapons, the Eiffel 
tower, and statements saying “God bless you in your mission” and “Support the deployment.”25 
321. After the Paris Attack, military intelligence saw these posts as evidence that the 
terrorists had gone operational.26 
322. Just prior to and during the Paris Attack, ISIS-related Twitter accounts posted 
messages warning and praising the attack, using hashtags (often in Arabic) including: 
#paris_ignites; #parisinflames; #paris; and @franceisonfire. 
323. For example, the ISIS-affiliated Twitter account @TurMedia316 posted the 
following message on the afternoon of the attack, which can be translated as, “O crusaders we 
are coming to you with bombs and rifles, wait for us #paris_ignites”:  
                                                          
25 Catherine Herridge, “72 hours before Paris attacks, ISIS-linked social media account 
reveals ‘God bless you in your mission,’” CNN (Nov. 15, 2015), http://www.foxnews.com/
world/2015/11/15/72-hours-before-paris-attacks-isis-linked-social-media-account-reveals-god-
1219447939.html. 
26 Id. 
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324. The following are additional examples of an ISIS-related Twitter account 
messages sent during the Paris Attack: 
   
325. On November 14, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release a written statement in 
several languages (including Arabic, French, and English) titled “A Statement on the Blessed 
Onslaught in Paris against the Crusader Nation of France,” in which ISIS claimed responsibility 
for the Paris Attack: 
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326. On November 14, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release an audio message again 
claiming responsibility for the Paris Attack. The voice of the ISIS representative who spoke in 
the audio message was identified as ISIS member Fabian Clain. 
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327. On November 17, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release a video message in French 
titled “Fight Them: With Your Hands Allah Will Punish Them.” The video featured four French-
speaking ISIS members praising and justifying the Paris Attack, and threatening additional 
attacks. 
328. On November 18, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release another video message titled 
“What’s Coming Will Be Even Worse.” The video featured three French-speaking ISIS members 
praising the Paris Attack and threatening additional attacks. 
329. On November 18, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release another video message titled 
“And our soldiers will prevail.” The video included a jihadi song in French titled “Go Forth, Go 
Forth,” which called for attacks against ISIS’s enemies. The video praised the Paris Attack and 
threatened additional attacks. 
330. On November 18, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release the twelfth issue of its online 
English-language magazine Dabiq, which featured the Paris Attack on its cover: 
 
331. On November 30, 2015, ISIS used Twitter to release the seventh issue of its 
online French-language magazine Dar al-Islam titled “France at its knees,” which praised the 
Paris Attack, and included a graphic multi-page photo montage of the attack: 
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332. On January 24, 2016, ISIS’s official al-Hayat Media Center used Twitter to 
release a video titled, “Kill Them Wherever You Find Them,” featuring the Paris attackers (the 
“Paris Attackers Video”): 
 
333. The Paris Attackers Video was in French and Arabic, and was distributed via 
Twitter in versions with Arabic and English subtitles. The video featured video messages from 
the nine ISIS terrorists (now dead) who carried out the November 13, 2015 Paris Attack, and 
they recorded the messages in anticipation of the attack, to be released by ISIS after their deaths. 
334. The Paris Attackers Video opens with an encrypted message, and then the 
following written message appears on the screen: 
“The following are the final messages of the nine lions of the Caliphate who were 
sent forth from their dens to bring an entire country – France – to her knees. They 
raised the word of tawhid [monotheism] and lived the verses of the Koran by 
killing the infidels wherever they found them. And they continued to do so until 
their thirst for success was quenched with nothing other than their own blood.” 
 
335. The Paris Attackers Video next shows news footage from the Paris Attack, and 
includes a song with the following lyrics in French: 
“Charronees, Bichat, Voltaire [names of Paris streets where attacks occurred] / 
my Kalashnikov is loaded / the civilians are unarmed / I am annihilating 
Frenchmen / It is [French Prime Minister] Valls who should be thanked . . . It is 
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only for the sake of Allah that have we made this choice / killing with hearts full 
of joy / we will kill you without mercy . . .” 
 
336. The first attacker to appear in the Paris Attackers Video is Abaaoud (a/k/a Abu 
Umar al-Baljiki), who speaks in French in front of an ISIS flag, a handgun, and an assault rifle: 
 
337. After Abaaoud, the Paris Attackers Video shows seven of the attackers in 
succession, dressed in identical battle fatigues, each delivering a message and then executing a 
captive. Five of these seven terrorists, Amimour (a/k/a Abu Qital al-Faransi), Agged (a/k/a Abu 
Fu’ad al-Faransi), Hadfi (a/k/a Abu Mujaed al-Baljiki), Akrouh (a/k/a Dhul-Qarayn al-Baljiki), 
and Mostefai (a/k/a Abu Rayyan al-Faransi), are shown executing captives by beheading them 
with a knife. The other two attackers, Iraqi ISIS members identified as Ukash al-Iraqi and Ali al-
Iraqi, make a joint statement in Arabic, and are shown executing captives by shooting them in 
the back of the head. 
338. Lastly, the ninth attacker in the Paris Attackers Video is Abaaoud’s brother, 
Brahim, who is shown in a different setting performing target practice, but he does not give a 
statement or execute a prisoner in the video. 
339. On February 6, 2016, ISIS used Twitter to release the eighth issue of its online 
French-language magazine Dar al-Islam, with Abaaoud’s picture on the cover: 
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340. ISIS’s Dar al-Islam Issue 8 was predominately dedicated to the Paris Attack. This 
issue included an editorial on the attack, as well as testaments of three of the Paris attackers: 
Abaaoud (a/k/a Abu Umar al-Baljiki); Mostefai (a/k/a Abu Rayyan al-Faransi); and Hadfi (a/k/a 
Abu Mujahid al-Baljiki): 
     
341. The issue also included a graphic multi-page photo montage of the attackers 
preparing for the attack: 
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342. On March 22, 2016, the morning of the Brussels attacks, ISIS followers used 
Twitter to broadcast messages praising the attacks using the hashtag “#Brussels” the Arabic 
hashtag “#BattleOf_Brussels,” and others. 
343.  ISIS also used Twitter to claim responsibility for the Brussels attacks, including 
by disseminating the following notice in Arabic, French, and English: 
 
344. ISIS also used Twitter to release several videos praising the Brussels attacks. 
345. For example, ISIS used Twitter to distribute a video titled, “The Exile of Islam 
and Brussels Attacks”: 
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346. The “Exile of Islam” video is more than nine minutes long; it shows scenes from 
the bombings at the Brussels airport and Maelbeek metro station, and a narrator states: “The 
Crusader jets—including the Belgians—are still bombing the Muslims in Iraq and Levant in the 
day and the night, killing children, women, old and destroying mosques and schools.” 
347. The “Exile of Islam” video also uses an image of Donald Trump and a statement 
he made in response to the attacks, as well as a jihadi song with the lyrics: “Brothers rise up! 
Claim your victory! Haha! Let’s go for Jihad!”: 
 
348. ISIS also used Twitter to distribute a video praising the Brussels attacks titled, 
“And What is to Come Will Be More Devastating and Bitter,” which included a statement by 
ISIS leader Abou ‘Umar Al-Muhajir stating that ISIS has soldiers everywhere, and as long as the 
infidels continue to bomb ISIS, they will continue to come and kill more infidels: 
  
349. ISIS also used Twitter to distribute video praising the Brussels attacks titled, “An 
Appropriate Recompense,” that tied the Brussels attacks to the November 2015 Paris attacks, and 
featured two Belgian ISIS fighters warning of more attacks: 
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350. ISIS also used Twitter to distribute another video praising the Brussels attacks 
titled, “And Cast Terror Into Their Hearts,” featuring Belgian ISIS leader Hicham Chaib 
(“Chaib”), also known as Abu Hanifa Al-Baljiki, calling the attacks a natural reaction to 
Belgium’s attacks on Muslims and Islam, and warning that ISIS will continue targeting its 
enemies on their own soil if the war against it continues: 
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351. On April 13, 2016, ISIS used Twitter to release the fourteenth issue of its online 
English-language magazine Dabiq: 
   
352. ISIS’s Dabiq Issue 14 praised the Brussels Attack and presented profiles of the 
three ISIS suicide terrorists who carried it out: Laachraoui (a/k/a Abu Idriss al-Baljiki); Bakraoui 
(a/k/a Abu Sulayman al-Baljiki); and Khalid (a/k/a Abu Walid al-Baljiki). The issue credited 
Laachraoui for preparing the explosives for both the Paris Attack and the Brussels Attack. The 
issue also presented a profile of Belkaid (a/k/a Abu Abdil-Aziz al-Jaza’iri), noted that he had 
been killed in a shootout that enabled his comrades to escape, and credited him with assisting in 
preparing the Brussels attack: 
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VI. NOHEMI GONZALEZ 
353. In the fall of 2015, Nohemi Gonzalez (“Nohemi”) was a 26-year-old industrial 
design student at California State University Long Beach spending a semester abroad at the 
Strate School of Design in Paris, France. 
 
354. Described by her friends and family as “bubbly,” “happy,” and “hard-working,” 
Nohemi was a first-generation Mexican-American born in California. 
355. This was Nohemi’s first time living in Europe, and her friends said that she could 
hardly believe her good fortune to be in Paris to see sights like the Eiffel Tower and the 
Cathedral of Notre Dame, and to fulfil her dream of studying in the famous city. 
356. On Friday evening, November 13, 2015, Nohemi and a group of friends were out 
for a night on the town and ended up at La Belle Équipe, a lively Paris bistro on Rue de 
Charonne. 
357. Tragically, at about 9:36 p.m., as Nohemi and her friends were only a few minutes 
into their meal, three ISIS terrorists, Abaaoud, Brahim, and Akrouh, arrived in a black Seat Leon 
car, approached the La Belle Equipe café, and began spraying bullets at the people at the café. 
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358. Nohemi was among 19 people murdered by the ISIS terrorists at the LaBelle 
Equipe café, and is believed to have been the only American killed in the Paris Attack. 
359. The F.B.I. told Nohemi’s family that it would be weeks before her body would be 
sent back to the United States because of the investigation. 
360. Nohemi was a college senior, and would have been the first member of her family 
to graduate college. 
361. The plaintiffs, Nohemi’s mother, step-father, and brothers were devastated by the 
loss of their only daughter and sister. They suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe 
psychological and emotional harm, as well as loss of solatium as a result of the terrorist attack 
that killed Nohemi Gonzalez. 
 
VII. ALEXANDER PINCZOWSKI 
362. Alexander Pinczowski (“Alex”) and his wife, plaintiff Anne Cameron Cain 
(“Cameron”), met in the summer of 2010 when they were both taking summer classes in 
Durham, North Carolina. The two fell in love with each other and were married in 2013. 
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363. In the spring of 2016, Alex and Cameron were living in New York. Alex and 
Cameron developed a business plan to open a craft-related business, and Alex travelled to 
Europe to work on their plan. 
364. Alex’s sister, Sascha Pinczowski (“Sasha”), who had graduated in 2015 with a 
business degree from Marymount Manhattan College in New York, was living in Europe and 
planned to move back to New York. 
 
365. On March 22, 2016, Alex was scheduled to fly back home to New York, and his 
sister Sascha decided to fly with him. 
366. Alex and Sascha arrived at the Brussels airport in the early morning of March 22, 
2016 and went to check in for their flight. 
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367. While Alex and Sascha were in the check-in area, one of the ISIS terrorists 
detonated his bomb, and Alex and Sascha were both killed. 
368. At the time of the explosion, Alex was speaking with his father on his cell phone. 
Alex’s father later said that while he was talking with his son, the phone sounded like it went 
underwater and then when dead. 
369. After the explosion, the family did not hear from Alex and Sascha, and the brother 
and sister could not be found. 
370. Family and friends in Europe searched for Alex and Sascha, checking all the 
nearby hospitals to no avail; Alex and Sascha’s family was devastated by news of the terrorist 
explosions at the airport and not knowing the fate of their loved ones. 
371. Alex’s wife Cameron also knew that Alex and Sascha were at the airport at the 
time of the explosion, and she also was uncertain of their fate; she was panic-stricken, not being 
able to reach Alex or determine what had happened to him and his sister for days. 
372. Cameron and her parents traveled from New York to Brussels on Wednesday, 
March 23, 2016 to join the search for Alex and Sascha. They frantically searched the hospitals of 
Brussels, spread photos around the city, and sent out pleas for assistance, while Cameron 
continued contacting people and posting notices to gain any information she could. 
373. On Thursday night, March 24, 2016, authorities in Brussels released a list of 
survivors from the Brussels Attack, and Alex and Sascha’s names were not on the list. 
374. Finally, on Friday, March 25, 2016, authorities confirmed that Alex and Sascha’s 
bodies had been identified and that they were killed in the attack. 
375. At the time of the terror attack, Alex was aged 29 and Sascha was aged 26. 
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376. Alex had become very connected to Cameron’s family, joining the family on 
vacations and family holidays. Cameron’s father described Alex as a brilliant young man.” 
377. Cameron and Alex as a couple were described as “so much in love,” 
“inseparable,” and as having “a passion for life.” Alex was a “family man” who “would do 
anything” for Cameron. 
378. Cameron was devastated by the loss of her husband Alex and his sister Sascha. 
She suffered, and will continue to suffer, severe psychological and emotional harm, as well as 
loss of solatium as a result of the terrorist attack that killed Alex and his sister. 
 
VIII. TWITTER’S CONDUCT 
A. Twitter Knowingly Provided Material Support and Resources to ISIS 
379. ISIS’s reputation as an organization that has engaged in and continues to engage 
in terrorist acts is widespread and has been reported in the world news media. 
380. ISIS’s designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization is public knowledge that 
has likewise been widely reported in the world news media. 
381. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Twitter has known that ISIS is an 
organization that has engaged in and continues to engage in terrorist activity. 
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382. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Twitter has known that ISIS is designated 
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. 
383. Despite this knowledge, Twitter has for years knowingly provided its Services to 
ISIS, its members, organizations owned or controlled by ISIS, and organizations and individuals 
that provide financing and material support to ISIS, including individuals and organizations that 
are designated as and SDGTs. 
384. ISIS, its members, and its related entities and affiliates have operated numerous 
Twitter accounts, often using their own names and displaying emblems and symbols associated 
with ISIS and its related terrorist entities. 
385. The identifiers for ISIS-associated Twitter accounts are often publicized on ISIS 
websites, social media sites, and via Twitter. 
386. ISIS’s news and media organizations operate Twitter accounts, often including 
separate accounts for Arabic and English. 
387. In January 2011, Twitter co-founder Biz Stone and Twitter General Counsel Alex 
Macgillivray wrote a blog post titled “The Tweets Must Flow,” in which they stated: “We don’t 
always agree with the things people choose to tweet, but we keep the information flowing 
irrespective of any view we may have about the content”; they also described their approach to 
law enforcement investigations: “While we may need to release information as required by law, 
we try to notify Twitter users before handing over their information whenever we can so they 
have a fair chance to fight the request if they so choose.”27 
                                                          
27 Biz Stone and Alex Macgillivray, “The Tweets Must Flow,” Twitter (Jan. 28, 2011), 
https://blog.twitter.com/2011/the-tweets-must-flow. 
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388. In December 2011, Israeli NGO Shurat HaDin-Israel Law Center wrote a letter to 
Twitter warning that Twitter’s provision of services to designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations violates the ATA prohibition against providing material support to terrorists. 
389. In January 2012, Twitter posted a new blog post titled “Tweets Still Must Flow,” 
in which it announced that, as Twitter expands internationally, it would need to withhold some 
content to comply with local national laws, for example in France and Germany where pro-Nazi 
content is banned; nevertheless, Twitter stated that it would only “reactively withhold content 
from users in a specific country—while keeping it available in the rest of the world.”28 
390. Twitter stressed, however, that it would not filter out any tweets before they 
appear, stating: “[W]e are going to be reactive only: that is, we will withhold specific content 
only when required to do so in response to what we believe to be a valid and applicable legal 
request.”29 
391. In a hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on 
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade on August 2, 2012, Chairman Ted Poe complained: 
“[W]hen it comes to a terrorist using Twitter, Twitter has not shut down or suspended a single 
account . . . Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that is unlawful to provide 
a designated FTO with ‘material, support, or resources, including any property, tangible or 
intangible, or services.’ Among those, communications equipment and facilities. Terrorists are 
using Twitter. Twitter is a communication service. It seems like it is a violation of the law.” 
392. In December 2012, several members of Congress wrote to FBI Director Robert 
Mueller asking the Bureau to demand that Twitter block the accounts of various terrorist groups. 
                                                          
28 “Tweets Still Must Flow,” Twitter (Jan. 26, 2012), https://blog.twitter.com/2012/
tweets-still-must-flow.  
29 Id. 
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393. On June 20, 2014, in a CNN report regarding ISIS’s use of Twitter as a tool to 
gain support, raise funds, and recruit members, Twitter co-founder Biz Stone responded: “If you 
want to create a platform that allows for freedom of expression for hundreds of millions of 
people around the world, you really have to take the good with the bad.”30 
394. On August 20, 2014, following harsh criticism for permitting ISIS to use Twitter 
to distribute gruesome video and images of the beheading of James Foley, Twitter’s then-CEO 
Dick Costolo tweeted: “We have been and are actively suspending accounts as we discover them 
related to this graphic imagery”; however, after ISIS next used Twitter to broadcast video and 
images of Steven Sotloff’s beheading on September 2, 2014, Twitter spokesperson Nu Wexler 
told U.S. News & World Report: “Twitter users around the world send approximately 500 
million tweets each day, and we do not monitor them proactively.”31 
395. Director of the SITE Intelligence Group, Rita Katz, who studies online jihadi 
activity, stated in September 2014: “For several years, ISIS followers have been hijacking 
Twitter to freely promote their jihad with very little to no interference at all . . . Twitter’s lack of 
action has resulted in a strong, and massive pro-ISIS presence on their social media platform, 
consisting of campaigns to mobilize, recruit and terrorize.”32 
                                                          
30 CNN Transcripts, “Erin Burnett Outfront: ISIS Urges English Speakers to Join Cause,” 
CNN (June 20, 2014), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1406/20/ebo.01.html. 
31 Tom Risen, “Twitter, Facebook, YouTube Grapple With Islamic State Censorship,” 
U.S. News & World Report (Sept. 5, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/05/
twitter-facebook-youtube-navigate-islamic-state-censorship.  
32 Alex Altman, “Why Terrorists Love Twitter,” Time (Sept. 11, 2014), http://time.com/
3319278/isis-isil-twitter/. 
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396. In November 2014, Mother Jones magazine reported on Twitter’s own ideological 
reasons for refusing to cease providing its Services to ISIS despite its terrorist designation. Based 
upon interviews and official statements released by Twitter, Mother Jones’ reported: 
“Waging a (virtual) war against ISIS is not on Twitter’s agenda. According to one 
Twitter company official . . . the tech firm is not interested in defining terrorism 
or silencing political speech. ‘One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom 
fighter,’ this Twitter official says, pointing out that Twitter has long been a home 
for political dissidents and unpopular and extreme views. ISIS, however radical 
and violent, isn’t an exception. Twitter, this official insists, takes terrorism and 
violence seriously, but does not compromise on its terms. 
. . . 
Overall, Twitter’s approach is hands-off. . . . Twitter has not come up with a 
comprehensive system for addressing terrorist messages and threats, partly 
because lists of terrorist groups can vary from one government to the next. (Just 
because a country declares an outfit a terrorist band, should Twitter ban it and its 
supporters? Maybe, maybe not. An authoritarian regime might designate an 
opposition group seeking democratic rule a terrorist threat.) 
. . . 
So despite the earlier media reports, Twitter is not mounting a crusade against 
ISIS. Members and supporters of the Islamic State are free to hit Twitter to 
preach, recruit, and spread the ideas underlying the group’s terror. As long as it 
doesn’t make direct threats, impersonate people, or pirate music [i.e., violate 
Twitter’s own rules], ISIS can exploit Twitter . . .”33 
 
397. In February 2015, an official Twitter spokesman confirmed to Yahoo News that it 
does not proactively monitor content, and that it only reviews posts that other Twitter users 
report as violating Twitter’s rules.34 
                                                          
33 Jenna McLaughlin, “Twitter Is Not At War With ISIS. Here’s Why.” Mother Jones 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/11/twitter-isis-war-ban-speech. 
34 Alexandra Klausner, “Twitter under pressure from lawmakers to crack down on 46,000 
ISIS sympathizer accounts,” Daily Mail (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/
article-2959198/Twitter-pressure-Congress-against-terrorists-report-identifies-46-000-ISIS-
sympathizer-accounts.html. 
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398. On February 24, 2015, Rep. Tim Poe gave a speech on the Floor of the U.S. 
House of Representatives, which included the following statements: 
“Federal law prohibits giving aid or helping a designated foreign terrorist 
organization. These FTOs use Twitter, an American company, as a tool and no 
one is stopping them. . . . Why are American companies and the U.S. government 
allowing social media platforms to be hijacked by terrorists? . . . It’s time for 
Twitter to take down terrorist accounts. . . . Terrorists should not have access to 
an American controlled social media platform so they can kill, rape, pillage and 
burn. . . . [A]llowing the terrorists to continue using Twitter has helped radicalize 
hundreds of foreign fighters and raised millions of dollars for them. . . . Private 
companies not only have a public responsibility but a legal obligation to be 
proactive. Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act states that it is 
unlawful to provide a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization—like ISIS—with 
‘material support or resources,’ including ‘any property, tangible or intangible, or 
services.’ That is about as comprehensive as you can get. You don't need to be a 
law school professor to understand this law actually applies to Twitter.”35 
 
399. On October 28, 2015, just over two weeks before the Paris Attack, the U.S. House 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform’s Subcommittee on National Security held a 
hearing on “Radicalism: Social Media and the Rise of Terrorism.” The Hon. Mark D. Wallace 
(“Amb. Wallace”), CEO of the Counter Extremism Project and former U.S. Ambassador to the 
United Nations, testified at that hearing on ISIS’s use of social media technology. Amb. 
Wallace’s written statement in the record of that hearing included the following testimony: 
“ISIS’s presence on social media is a cancer. It continues to metastasize, largely 
unaddressed by government, the private sector, or social media companies. One of 
the most pressing public safety and national security issues we face today is 
without a doubt the hijacking and weaponization of social media platforms by 
extremist groups to radicalize, recruit new members, and plan violent attacks 
against innocent people around the world. 
. . . 
                                                          
35 Rep. Ted Poe, “Floor Remarks: Twitter and Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” (Feb. 24, 
2015), http://poe.house.gov/2015/2/twitter-and-foreign-terrorist-organizations. 
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Since its creation, ISIS in particular has deployed an incredibly sophisticated 
social media campaign to radicalize and recruit new members and to call for acts 
of terror around the world. There are at least 43,000 active pro-ISIS Twitter 
accounts, sending approximately 200,000 tweets a day, amplifying and endlessly 
repeating ISIS’s messages of hate and terror. 
. . . 
Unfortunately, the response we’ve gotten from Twitter is dismissive to the point 
of dereliction. . . . Twitter’s dismissiveness on the issue of violent extremists who 
have hijacked and weaponized its platform can best be summarized in a quote 
provided to Mother Jones magazine by a Twitter official: ‘One man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter.’ Of course this statement is insipid and unserious, 
particularly in the context of al Qaeda and ISIS and many other extremist groups.” 
 
400. Amb. Wallace also described Twitter as a “gateway drug” by which vulnerable 
individuals are first exposed to ISIS’s propaganda and radical content, and the individuals are 
then led to more in-depth questions and conversations to radicalize and recruit these individuals 
for jihad and joining ISIS. 
401. Through Twitter’s services, Twitter makes potential ISIS recruits, ISIS members, 
and ISIS leaders, available to other ISIS operatives, thus providing personnel to ISIS itself. 
402. Prior to the Paris and Brussels attacks, Twitter refused to actively monitor its 
online social media network to block ISIS’s use of Twitter. Instead, Twitter knowingly 
permitted, and still permits, ISIS and ISIS’s members and affiliates to use its online social media 
platform, and generally only reviews ISIS’s use of Twitter in response to third party complaints. 
403. Even when Twitter has received complaints about ISIS’s use of the platform, 
despite knowing that ISIS is a designated FTO and that ISIS has engaged in terrorist activity, 
Twitter has at various times determined that ISIS’s use of Twitter did not violate Twitter’s 
policies and permitted the accounts to remain active, or removed only a portion of the content 
posted on an ISIS-related Twitter account and permitted the account to remain active. 
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404. While Twitter has suspended or blocked selected ISIS-related Twitter accounts at 
various times, prior to the Brussels Attack Twitter did not make substantial or sustained efforts to 
ensure that ISIS would not re-establish the account using a new identifier. 
405. For example, the Twitter account of ISIS’s Asawitiri Media group has had at least 
335 accounts. As mentioned above, one iteration of this ISIS Twitter user (@TurMedia316) 
tweeted about the Paris Attack on the afternoon that it began. When @TurMedia333 was 
subsequently suspended, the group opened @TurMedia334. When the latter account was 
suspended, the group opened @TurMedia335. Moreover, each of these accounts used the same 
user photograph. 
406. Shortly after the San Bernardino terrorist attack in December 2015, ISIS used 
Twitter account @TurMedia335 to tweet: “California, we have already arrived with our soldiers. 
Decide how to be your end, with knife or bomb.” 
407. Twitter has even removed suspensions of ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts, thus 
permitting the account to become active again. 
408. Immediately after the Paris Attack, the activist computer-hacking group 
“Anonymous” organized a campaign to identify ISIS-affiliated Twitter accounts and to report 
those accounts to Twitter to have them blocked. Anonymous claimed that it had successfully 
reported many thousands of ISIS Twitter accounts. 
409. On February 5, 2016, Twitter wrote a blog post that seemed to imply that it had 
taken steps itself to identify and suspend ISIS Twitter accounts. 
410. However, Anonymous countered that Twitter had only responded to third-party 
reports such as those from Anonymous, and that Twitter had not shut down many of the “core” 
ISIS accounts that had been reported to the company. 
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411. Despite the efforts of Anonymous and others who report ISIS accounts to Twitter, 
because Twitter allows many of the “core” ISIS accounts to remain, ISIS is able to maintain a 
Twitter presence consisting of thousands of active accounts, as well as quickly reestablish 
accounts with large numbers of Twitter followers. 
412. In March 2016, prior to the Brussels Attack, Twitter was found to be shutting 
down the Twitter accounts of the Anonymous members who had reported ISIS Twitter accounts, 
“for harassing ISIS members” who use Twitter.36 
B. Twitter’s Social Media Platform and Communications Services are Unique 
413. Twitter’s online social media platform and communication services are provided 
to Twitter users via Twitter’s unique computer architecture. 
414. Whenever a Twitter user shares information on Twitter, Twitter’s computer 
servers receive the information and distribute it to the Twitter user’s network of Twitter 
“followers.” The tweet also appears on the Twitter user’s Twitter account page, and is available 
via Twitter’s platform, hashtags, and search engines on the internet, depending upon the user’s 
privacy settings. 
415. Information that is input by a Twitter user into Twitter is also stored on Twitter’s 
computer equipment as well as on Twitter’s backup storage equipment. 
416. Twitter users’ Twitter accounts are hosted on Twitter’s computer equipment.  
417. Twitter enables users to connect and communicate with followers or with others 
via posts that can be in the form of a short message, a photo with a caption, sharing a web link or 
a news article from another website, or linking to other social media platforms. 
                                                          
36 Zoie O’Brien, “Twitter shuts down Anonymous accounts ‘for harassing’ ISIS jihadis,” 
Express (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.express.co.uk/news/uk/650254/Twitter-ANONYMOUS-
ISIS-jihadis. 
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418. Twitter users also “like” and “retweet” others’ posts, thereby exposing these posts 
to new networks. 
419. Twitter’s “hashtag” feature enhances Twitter’s services to ISIS by enabling ISIS 
to provide key words by which its members and followers can easily locate ISIS Twitter 
accounts and spread ISIS’s contacts and communications exponentially. 
420. Twitter uses computer algorithms to match accounts with similarities, so that 
similar Twitter accounts are suggested to a user or reader when viewing a Twitter account. In 
this way, users are able to locate other Twitter accounts related to ISIS even if they do not know 
the correct identifier or if the original Twitter account has been replaced by a new identifier. 
421. Effectively, Twitter serves as a broker or match-maker between like-minded 
people, introducing users to other users that they will be interested in based on the information in 
their “tweets.” These types of suggestions appear on the side margin of the reader’s Twitter page.  
422. By providing Twitter’s online social network platform and communication 
services to ISIS, Twitter is providing to ISIS use of Twitter’s unique computer architecture, 
computer servers, storage and communication equipment, a highly-developed and sophisticated 
algorithms, and services that facilitate ISIS’s ability to reach and engage an audience it could not 
otherwise reach as effectively. 
423. As discussed above, Twitter’s usefulness to ISIS is not merely about content; ISIS 
uses Twitter is a tool to connect with others and promote its terrorist activity. 
424. Twitter recognized this kind of value to its users in its 2016 Annual Report filed 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, when it stated that it is “working toward 
giving our creators and influencers better tools to connect with their fans and audience through 
Twitter.” 
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C. Twitter Can Deny Services to ISIS, But Has Refused to Do So 
425. The same algorithms that allow Twitter to connect users of similar interests could 
be used by Twitter to identify, flag, review, and remove ISIS Twitter accounts. 
426. Twitter has other tools as well by which it can identify, flag, review, and remove 
ISIS Twitter accounts. 
427. In December 2015, SITE Intelligence Group Director Rita Katz stated: “The 
bottom line is that Twitter is not doing enough . . . With the technology Twitter has, they can 
immediately stop these accounts, but they have done nothing to stop the dissemination and 
recruitment of lone wolf terrorists.”37 
428. Most technology experts agree that Twitter is not using available means to cease 
providing its Services to ISIS. 
429. For example, Prof. Hany Farid, chairman of the computer science department at 
Dartmouth College, co-developed with Microsoft a system for tracking and blocking child 
pornography on the internet, and he asserts that the same technology could be used to block 
terrorists. In December 2015, Prof. Faris stated: “When Twitter says, ‘We can’t do this,’ I don’t 
believe that. . . . There’s no fundamental technology or engineering limitation . . . This is a 
business or policy decision. Unless the companies have decided that they just can’t be 
bothered.”38 
430. Indeed, Twitter made policy decisions and taken proactive actions that would 
actually protect ISIS and other terrorists in their use of Twitter’s Services. 
                                                          
37 Nicole Perlroth and Mike Isaac, “Terrorists Mock Bids to End Use of Social Media,” 
The New York Times (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/08/technology/terrorists-
mock-bids-to-end-use-of-social-media.html. 
38 Id. 
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431. For example, Twitter has had a policy and practice of notifying users in the event 
it suspects or determines that the user’s Twitter account is under government surveillance or if 
Twitter has received an investigative inquiry about a user’s Twitter account. 
432. In fact, in an attempt to maintain its policy and practice of alerting criminal 
suspects, Twitter has sued the U.S. Department of Justice, challenging government orders that 
prohibit Twitter from disclosing details of investigative requests due to national security 
concerns. 
433. Although Twitter’s lawsuit against the government was ordered dismissed in May 
2016 for failure to state a claim, Twitter revived the suit by filing Second Amended Complaint in 
the case which is currently pending. 
434. Moreover, in May 2016 Twitter barred U.S. intelligence agencies from 
purchasing and using the Twitter analytics service “Dataminr” (of which Twitter owns about a 
5% stake) to identify unfolding terrorist attacks and political unrest. Dataminr executives told 
U.S. intelligence agencies that Twitter did not want the company to continue providing the 
service to them 39 
435.  Dataminr is the only company Twitter authorizes both to access its entire real-
time stream of public tweets and sell it to clients. 
436. The Dataminr product goes beyond what a typical Twitter user could find in the 
jumble of daily tweets, employing sophisticated algorithms and geolocation tools to unearth 
relevant patterns. 
                                                          
39 Christopher S. Stewart and Mark Maremont, “Twitter Bars Intelligence Agencies From 
Using Analytics Service,” The Wall Street Journal (May 8, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/twitter-bars-intelligence-agencies-from-using-analytics-service-1462751682. 
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437. Significantly, Dataminr gave the U.S. intelligence community an alert about the 
Paris Attack shortly after the attack began, and notified clients about the Brussels Attack 10 
minutes ahead of news media as well. 
438. In response to Twitter’s ban of Dataminr sales to U.S. agencies, Michael Smith II, 
security consulting firm Kronos Advisory’s chief operating officer, stated: “Twitter’s decision 
could have grave consequences.” 
439. In August 2016, after a 12-month inquiry on countering extremism that included 
testimony from Twitter and other social media company executives, the U.K. House of 
Commons’ Home Affairs Committee issued a report titled “Radicalisation: the counter-narrative 
and identifying the tipping point.” (“U.K. Report”).40 
440. In the U.K. Report, the Home Affairs Committee found that:  
“The use of the internet to promote radicalisation and terrorism is one of the 
greatest threats that countries . . . face. 
. . . 
Social media companies are consciously failing to combat the use of their sites to 
promote terrorism and killings. Networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube 
are the vehicle of choice in spreading propaganda and they have become the 
recruiting platforms for terrorism. They must accept that the hundreds of millions 
in revenues generated from billions of people using their products needs to be 
accompanied by a greater sense of responsibility and ownership for the impact 
that extremist material on their sites is having. There must be a zero tolerance 
approach to online extremism, including enticement to join extremist groups or 
commit attacks of terror and any glorification of such activities. . . . It is therefore 
alarming . . . that Twitter does not even proactively report extremist content to 
law enforcement agencies. These companies are hiding behind their supranational 
                                                          
40 Home Affairs Committee, “Radicalisation: the counter-narrative and identifying the 
tipping point,” House of Commons (Aug. 25, 2016), http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/135/135.pdf. 
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legal status to pass the parcel of responsibility and refusing to act responsibly in 
case they damage their brands.”41 
 
441. In fact, Twitter actually benefits from ISIS’s use of its Services and has an 
incentive to refrain from shutting down ISIS accounts, particularly due to the tremendous volume 
of ISIS Twitter accounts and the volume of tweets ISIS generates. 
442. Research has shown that ISIS Twitter users are overall much more active than the 
average Twitter users both in terms of the number of tweets and in the number of Twitter users 
who link to the subject accounts as “followers.”42 
443. The primary measurements used by Twitter to demonstrate its usefulness and 
generate revenue from advertisers and partners are: the total number of active Twitter users; the 
number of daily tweets; and the growth rate of the number of users and tweets. 
444. Thus, in its 2016 Annual Report filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Twitter’s statement regarding the risks related to its business included the 
following: 
“The size of our user base and our users’ level of engagement are critical to our 
success. . . . Our financial performance has been and will continue to be 
significantly determined by our success in growing the number of users and 
increasing their overall level of engagement on our platform. 
. . . 
If we are unable to increase our user base, user growth rate, or user engagement, 
or if these metrics decline, our products and services could be less attractive to 
potential new users, as well as to advertisers and platform partners, which would 
have a material and adverse impact on our business, financial condition and 
operating results.” 
 
 
                                                          
41 Id. at 11, 13-14 (original in bold). 
42 Berger, “The Twitter Census,” supra note 16. 
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CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
LIABILITY FOR AIDING AND ABETTING 
ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d) 
 
445. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation of the foregoing 
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
446. Since 2004, ISIS has been, and continues to be, a designated foreign terrorist 
organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
447. ISIS has committed, planned, or authorized activities that involved violence or 
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, including 
inter alia the prohibition on killing, attempting to kill, causing serious bodily injury, or 
attempting to cause serious bodily injury to U.S. citizens as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 2332. 
448. These activities committed, planned, or authorized by ISIS appear to have been, 
and were intended to: (a) intimidate or coerce the civilian population of France, Belgium, the 
United States and other countries; (b) influence the policy of the Governments of France, 
Belgium, the United States and other countries by intimidation or coercion; or (c) affect the 
conduct of the Governments of France, Belgium, the United States and other countries by mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. 
449. These activities committed, planned, or authorized by ISIS occurred entirely or 
primarily outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and constituted acts of 
international terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1). 
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450. Plaintiffs have been injured in their person by reason of the acts of international 
terrorism committed, planned, or authorized by ISIS. 
451. At all times relevant to this action, Twitter knew that ISIS was a Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, that it had engaged in and continued to engage in illegal acts of terrorism, 
including international terrorism. 
452. Twitter knowingly provided substantial assistance and encouragement to ISIS, 
and thus aided and abetted ISIS in committing, planning, or authorizing acts of international 
terrorism, including the acts of international terrorism that injured plaintiffs. 
453. By aiding and abetting ISIS in committing, planning, or authorizing acts of 
international terrorism, including acts that caused each of the plaintiffs to be injured in his or her 
person and property, Twitter is liable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d) for threefold any 
and all damages that plaintiffs have sustained as a result of such injuries, and the costs of this 
suit, including attorney’s fees. 
 
SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
LIABILITY FOR CONSPIRING IN FURTHERANCE OF 
ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 
PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and (d) 
 
454. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation of the foregoing 
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
455. Twitter knowingly agreed, licensed, and permitted ISIS and its affiliates to 
register and use Twitter to promote and carry out ISIS’s activities, including ISIS’s illegal acts of 
international terrorism that injured plaintiffs. 
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456. Twitter was aware that U.S. federal law prohibited providing material support and 
resources to, or engaging in transactions with, designated foreign terrorist organizations and 
other specially designated terrorists. 
457. Twitter thus conspired with ISIS in its illegal provision of Twitter to promote and 
carry out ISIS’s illegal acts of international terrorism, including the acts that injured plaintiffs. 
  458. By conspiring with ISIS in furtherance of ISIS’s committing, planning, or 
authorizing acts of international terrorism, including acts that caused each of the plaintiffs to be 
injured in his or her person and property, Twitter is liable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) and 
(d) for threefold any and all damages that plaintiffs have sustained as a result of such injuries, 
and the costs of this suit, including attorney’s fees. 
 
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
PROVISION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS 
IN VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339A AND 18 U.S.C. § 2333 
 
459. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation of the foregoing 
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
460. The online social media platform and communication services which Twitter 
knowingly provided to ISIS, including use of Twitter’s services, computers and communications 
equipment, substantially assisted ISIS in carrying out its terrorist activities, including recruiting, 
radicalizing, and instructing terrorists, raising funds, creating fear and carrying out attacks, 
among other things. 
461. These services and equipment constituted material support and resources pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, and they facilitated acts of terrorism in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2332 that 
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caused the deaths of Nohemi Gonzalez, Alexander Pinczowski and Sascha Pinczowski and 
injuries to plaintiffs. 
462. Twitter provided these services and equipment to ISIS, knowing that they were to 
be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, criminal acts including the acts that injured the 
plaintiffs. 
463. As set forth more fully above, but for the material support and resources provided 
by Twitter, the attack that injured the plaintiffs would have been substantially more difficult to 
implement. 
464. By participating in the commission of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A that have 
caused the plaintiffs to be injured in his or her person, business or property, Twitter is liable 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333 for any and all damages that plaintiffs have sustained as a result of 
such injuries. 
 
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
PROVISION OF MATERIAL SUPPORT AND RESOURCES 
TO A DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION 
IN VIOLATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) AND 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) 
 
465. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each and every allegation of the foregoing 
paragraphs as if fully set forth herein. 
466. By knowingly (or with willful blindness) providing its social media platform and 
communications services, including use of computer and communications equipment, for the 
benefit of ISIS, Twitter has provided material support and resources to a designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organization under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1). 
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467. Twitter knew of (or was willfully blind to) ISIS’s terrorist activities. 
468. Twitter knew (or was willfully blind to the fact) that ISIS had been designated a 
Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States Government. 
469. Twitter’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B proximately caused the damages to 
plaintiffs described herein. 
470. By knowingly (or with willful blindness) providing material support to a 
designated Foreign Terrorist Organization, Twitter is therefore civilly liable for damages to 
plaintiffs for their injuries pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). 
 
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
WRONGFUL DEATH 
471. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the foregoing allegations with the same 
force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 
472. Twitter provides services to ISIS that, among other things, substantially assist and 
contribute to ISIS’s ability to carry out its terrorist activities. 
473. As set forth more fully above, but for the assistance provided by the Twitter, the 
terrorist attack that killed Nohemi Gonzalez and Alexander Pinczowski and injured the plaintiffs 
would have been substantially more difficult to implement. 
474. Twitter’s conduct was unreasonable and outrageous and exceeds the bounds 
usually tolerated by decent society, and was done willfully, maliciously and deliberately, or with 
reckless indifference to the life of the victims of ISIS’s terrorist activity, including Nohemi 
Gonzalez and Alexander Pinczowski. 
Case 1:17-cv-00122   Document 1   Filed 01/08/17   Page 90 of 92
-91- 
 
475. The conduct of Twitter was a direct, foreseeable and proximate cause of the 
wrongful deaths of Nohemi Gonzalez, Alexander Pinczowski and the injuries of the plaintiffs, 
and therefore Twitter is liable to the plaintiffs for the wrongful deaths of Nohemi Gonzalez and 
Alexander Pinczowski and related damages. 
476. Twitter’s actions were undertaken willfully, wantonly, maliciously and in reckless 
disregard for plaintiff’s rights, and as a direct, foreseeable and proximate result thereof plaintiffs 
suffered economic and emotional damage in a total amount to be proven at trial, therefore 
plaintiffs seek punitive damages in an amount sufficient to deter Twitter and others from similar 
future wrongful conduct. 
 
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
477. Plaintiffs repeat and re-allege each of the foregoing allegations with the same 
force and effect as if more fully set forth herein. 
478. Twitter engaged in negligent behavior by providing services to ISIS.  
479. Twitter’s acts of providing services to ISIS constituted a willful violation of 
federal statutes, and thus amounted to a willful violation of a statutory standard. 
480. As a direct, foreseeable and proximate result of the conduct of Twitter as alleged 
hereinabove, Plaintiffs have suffered severe emotional distress, and therefore Twitter is liable to 
the plaintiffs for the plaintiffs’ severe emotional distress and related damages. 
 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray that this Court: 
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  (a) Enter judgment against Twitter and in favor of each plaintiff for 
compensatory damages in amounts to be determined at trial; 
  (b) Enter judgment against Twitter and in favor of each plaintiff for treble 
damages pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333; 
  (c) Enter judgment against Twitter and in favor of each plaintiff for any and 
all costs sustained in connection with the prosecution of this action, including attorneys’ fees, 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2333; 
  (d) Enter an Order declaring that Twitter has violated, and is continuing to 
violate, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq.; and 
  (e) Grant such other and further relief as justice requires. 
JURY DEMAND 
PLAINTIFFS DEMAND A TRIAL BY JURY ON ALL ISSUES SO TRIABLE. 
Dated: Brooklyn, New York  
January 8, 2017 
Respectfully submitted, 
THE BERKMAN LAW OFFICE, LLC 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs 
 
by:       
 Robert J. Tolchin 
111 Livingston Street, Suite 1928 
Brooklyn, New York 11201 
718-855-3627 
 
NITSANA DARSHAN-LEITNER & CO. 
Israeli counsel for the Plaintiffs 
By: Nitsana Darshan-Leitner, Adv. 
10 Hata’as Street 
Ramat Gan, 52512 Israel 
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